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Abstract
While it is widely believed that regions which experienced a transition to Neolithic
agriculture early also become institutionally and economically more advanced, many
indicators suggest that within the Western agricultural core (including Europe, North
Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia), communities that adopted agriculture
early in fact have weaker institutions and poorly functioning economies today. In the
current paper, we attempt to integrate both of these trends in a coherent historical
framework. Our main argument is that countries that made the transition early also
tended to develop autocratic societies with social inequality and pervasive rent seeking,
whereas later adopters were more likely to have egalitarian societies with stronger
private property rights. These di¤erent institutional trajectories implied a gradual
shift of dominance from the early civilizations towards regions in the periphery. We
document this relative reversal within the Western core by showing a robust negative
correlation between years since transition to agriculture and contemporary levels of
income and institutional development, on both the national and the regional level.
Our results further indicate that the reversal had become manifest already before the
era of European colonization.
Keywords: Neolithic agriculture, comparative development
JEL Codes: N50, O43
1 Introduction
A striking feature of current world development is that most of the countries near the
"cradle of civilization" in Southwestern Asia are now in serious disorder. Countries like
Iraq, Egypt and Syria - all with a history of at least 5,000 years of statehood and advanced
urbanized economies - have recently experienced numerous symptoms of state collapse;
mass political violence, desperate people looting stores, and governments that cling on to
power through brute military force. When the US armies invaded Iraq in 2003 and toppled
Saddam Husseins autocratic and repressive government, military tanks drove over ancient
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cities sometimes 7,000 years old, prospering due to sophisticated irrigation management
and carefully coordinated collective action.
Meanwhile, people in the Nordic countries, in the northern periphery of the Western
cultural zone, continue to benet from peace and stability with some of the least corrupt
governments the world as well as highly advanced economies. In a long-run perspective,
this relative prosperity of the northern periphery is equally striking. At about the same
time that massive temples and city walls were erected in the Mesopotamian cities (3500
BCE), the rst farmers migrated to Scandinavia and settled among hunter-gatherers,
bringing wheat and goats that were originally domesticated in the Middle East. Civiliza-
tion in terms of statehood above tribal level, did not generally emerge here until after
1000 CE. Yet, the current income per capita in for instance Sweden is about 45 times
higher than in Iraq. Is this fundamental reversal of fortune within Western civilization a
historical accident?
This paper re-investigates how the Neolithic Revolution may have a¤ected modern eco-
nomic outcomes through its impact on early institutions. The Neolithic Revolution was a
momentous event which introduced agriculture to humans around the year 10,000 BCE.
It marked for the rst time humans departure from their hunter-gatherer lifestyle for
agriculture and sedentary living. Our main argument is that regions in the Western core
that made an early transition to Neolithic agriculture also experienced a long history of
autocratic rule, intense rent seeking, and high income inequality. Due to institutional per-
sistence, these adverse e¤ects of early agriculture and statehood eventually hampered the
economic progress of the early civilizations and led to relatively low levels of development
today. Conversely, regions that made the transition later were more likely to experience
more democratic rule, low rent seeking and corruption, low inequality, and technological
innovativeness, and ultimately a more sustained process of economic growth.
A straightforward hypothesis from this argument is that there should be a negative
(reduced-form) relationship between the time since a regions transition to Neolithic agri-
culture and current income per capita. In order to test this hypothesis, we rst create a
new data set of countriesand regionsaverage date of transition to agriculture, using in-
formation from 765 georeferenced archaeological sites in Europe from Pinhasi et al (2005).
We then carry out an empirical investigation on three levels; an analysis among 1,371
European regions, a cross-regional study of 107 Italian regions, and lastly a cross-country
study of 64 countries within the Western core.1
Our results demonstrate that there is a robust negative relationship between time
since transition to agriculture and current levels of GDP per capita. Although some of
our historical transmission channels are unobservable, the strong association in the pre-
dicted direction between time of agricultural transition and current levels of corruption,
democracy, and income equality strongly indicate that institutions are a key intermediate
channel between the Neolithic transition and current development. Using historical data
1 In an online appendix, we also provide a more in-depth case study comparative analysis between two
extreme countries in our sample; Sweden and Iraq.
2
on proxies for economic development in 1500 CE, we further show that the reversal of
fortune appears to have been in place at least 500 years ago, i.e. before Western colo-
nization and industrialization, and seems to have manifested itself between 1000-1500 CE.
We argue that although industrialization in particular contributed critically to the massive
divergence between countries that emerged during the last 200 years, our analysis suggests
that the relative prosperity of North European regions followed a longer trajectory with
roots in the Neolithic.
Our paper is related to a huge literature on Western economic and social history.2 In
his classic work on the long-run impact of plant and animal domestication, Jared Diamond
(1997) argues that the region making up the Fertile Crescent in the Middle East (roughly
Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Southeastern Turkey, Iraq, and Western Iran) was the rst to make
the transition to agriculture by about 9000 BCE because of its superior access to plants and
animals suitable for domestication. Even though other regions also developed agriculture
independently (for instance China, Mexico, the Andes region, Papua New Guinea, etc),
the highly favorable biogeography in the Fertile Crescent and in large parts of the rest
of the Western agricultural core (encompassing Europe, South Asia including western
India, and North Africa) implied that this part of the world could develop civilization,
statehood, science, military technology, and political strategy much earlier. By 1500 CE,
these advantages of an early start allowed European countries to colonize and dominate
much of the rest of the World.3
In subsequent research, what might be referred to as a "naive" version of Jared Dia-
monds (1997) hypothesis has been tested: That current income levels across the world
should have a positive relationship with biogeographical suitability for agriculture in pre-
history and/or with the timing of the agricultural transition (Hibbs and Olsson, 2004;
Olsson and Hibbs, 2005; Putterman, 2008; Ashraf et al, 2010, Putterman and Weil, 2010;
Bleaney and Dimico, 2011). Most of these studies have conrmed a positive relation-
ship on a worldwide basis, suggesting that countries that made the transition early had a
long-term advantage that is still detectable in current levels of prosperity.4
In this paper, we argue that this positive relationship is mainly driven by di¤erences
between agricultural core region averages, whereas the relationship within the Western
core (the region that made the transition rst) is actually negative.5 Figure 1 illustrates
2An incomplete listing of the most important works includes Jones (1981), Kennedy (1988), Mokyr
(1990), Landes (1998), Pomeranz (2000), Clark (2008), and Morris (2010).
3Other important contributions to our understanding of the Neolithic transition include Harlan (1995),
Smith (1998), and Bellwood (2005). In the economics literature, see Ashraf and Michalopoulos (2011) for
an account of the spread of agriculture in Europe using the data from Pinhasi et al (2005). Weisdorf (2005)
reviews the arguments on the transition to agriculture.
4Ashraf and Galor (2011) use Olsson and Hibbs(2005) cross-country measure of plants and animals
suitable for agriculture and Puttermans (2006) data on time since agricultural transition as proxies for
levels of technological advancement before 1500 AD. The authors show that an early transition to agricul-
ture gave rise to high population density but not to higher income per capita in 1500 AD, in line with the
Malthusian model.
5A more detailed analysis in the last section suggests that the relationship between time since agri-
cultural transition and current income levels is negative also in within two other agricultural cores; Sub-
Saharan Africa and East Asia.
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this point and also summarizes one of the key insights of the paper. The graph shows the
bivariate relationship between log GDP per capita in 2005 and the time (in years) since
agricultural transition for 158 countries. As the gure shows, the relationship is positive
when all 158 countries are included in the regression (black line). However, when the
relationships within agricultural core areas (Western, Sub-Saharan Africa, and East Asia)
are investigated separately, we see in the graph that the relationships turn negative. The
negative relationship for the Western core region in the upper right corner, is the main
nding of this paper that we document in various ways.
Figure 1
In line with this evidence, we suggest a new and extended version of Diamonds model:
Average income levels per capita are higher in the Western core than in all other parts
of the world due to the advantages of an early transition to agriculture and civilization,
but in comparisons within agricultural core areas, early adoptions of agriculture led to
a relatively low level of current economic development. In the original Diamond model,
Neolithic biogeography played an important role for Eurasia as a whole by introducing
agriculture to the hunter-gatherers in the continent earlier than any other regions in the
world. The continent in turn witnessed a headstart in technological advances and complex
institutional development to support increasingly sedentary and dense population, such
that the rise of statehood and empires closely followed agricultural adoption timing. In the
extended version, we analyze variations within the Western core, and argue that it was the
timing of expansion of the early farmers which determined di¤erent types of institutions
and economic performance in the long run.
Our analysis demonstrates that the impact of the timing of agricultural adoption mat-
tered to income levels, independent of soil quality. That is, we show that regions with same
types of biogeographical endowment during the Neolithic times do not necessarily have the
same income levels today. These ndings demonstrate that the reason behind long term
divergence in current incomes cannot be solely attributed to natural surroundings. For
example, both Spain and Turkey were occupied by Dry Steppe vegetation at the advent
of the Neolithic Revolution, but have vastly di¤erent income levels today. Furthermore, it
may be that once Europe acquired the advantage of domesticable species that the Fertile
Crescent introduced, Europe naturally had climatic and soil advantages relative to the
Fertile Crescent. The Fertile Crescent lacked Europes thick fertile glaciated soils and was
exposed to more landscape degradation due to its dry climate. The explanation of the
reversal of fortune within the Western agricultural core however still cannot be explained
by biogeography alone. Various parts of Italy currently endowed with productive lands
still lack the institutions that Scandinavian countries enjoy.
A second highly related tradition in the literature is the institutional view of Western
long-run history, associated with North and Thomas (1973), North (1990), and a string
of important contributions by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson,
summarized in Acemoglu et al (2005a) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). In their most
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recent work, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) downplay the importance of "geography as
destiny" and argues that economic outcomes are a result of an interplay between polit-
ical and economic institutions that can be either inclusive (democratic and with strong
private property rights) or extractive (autocratic with monopoly rents for a favored elite).
Countries embark upon their major paths of development at certain critical junctures in
history and are otherwise subject to institutional drift.6
According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), such a model better explains why Britain
and the United States ultimately developed institutions conducive to industrial develop-
ment than models based on geography. The authors argue, for instance, that it is hard to
use Jared Diamonds model of biogeographical potential to explain why peripheral Britain
with its late transition to civilization could become the engine of industrialization. In the
analysis of this paper, this institutional view can be reconciled with our emphasis on the
crucial importance of the Neolithic. The key di¤erence is that in our model, the devel-
opmental advantages of Northern Europe in more recent history did not come about as a
result of institutional drift but due to a long-run trajectory from the onset of agriculture.
A third emerging tradition in economics focuses on the importance of other long-term
trajectories. Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) and Ashraf and Galor (2012) show that the spread
of modern (hunting-gathering) populations out of Africa in prehistory implied that regions
that were colonized late had a lower genetic diversity than in the African "homeland".
Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) show that this has resulted in a lower ethnic diversity in more
recently settled countries (like Sweden) whereas Ashraf and Galor (2012) demonstrate that
there appears to exist a trade-o¤ between more or less genetic diversity such that countries
with a medium level have had the highest levels of economic development throughout
history.7 Ashraf et al (2010), show that geographical isolation has had a positive e¤ect on
economic development and argue that the result is explained by a greater reliance on own
innovations in the periphery. Using newly constructed data on the levels of technological
sophistication in countries from about 1000 BCE, Comin et al (2010) argue that there has
been a strong tendency for technological persistence through history. When we use their
data for the Western sample, we show that there has actually been a technological reversal
from the origins of agriculture to 1500 CE.
In summary, we believe the paper makes the following contributions to the literature.
Firstly, we present a new theory with supportive evidence of a reversal of fortune since the
Neolithic within the Western core area. Secondly, we create new data for the emergence of
agriculture among all Western countries as well as among nearly 1,400 regions. Thirdly, we
demonstrate how previous results of a positive association between time since agriculture
and current income can be reconciled with our evidence of a negative relationship within
6 Institutional drift is a metaphor borrowed from genetics where genetic drift describes how two otherwise
identical phenotypes might develop very di¤erent traits after separation over time due to random processes
that have nothing to do with natural selection. See Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) for an economic treatment
of cultural drift.
7The importance of genetic di¤erences originating in prehistory is also studied by Spolaore and Wasziarg
(2009).
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the Western agricultural core.
The paper proceeds in the following order: Section 2 describes the argument behind
agricultural transition and development, whereas Section 3 introduces the data used for
empirical results as well as the econometric strategy. The same section then proceeds with
the empirical ndings, whereas Section 4 discusses external validity and our extended
model. Finally, Section 5 concludes by summarizing the ndings and o¤ering avenues for
future research.
2 The argument
2.1 Agricultural transition and current levels of development
In his widely acclaimed work on the long-run importance of the Neolithic revolution,
Jared Diamond (1997) outlines a theory arguing that societies that transited early into
agriculture in prehistory achieved a head start over other societies in terms of social,
political, and technological development which ultimately explained why it was Europeans
who colonized the native Americans rather than vice versa. The early onset of agriculture
in the Western core was in turn explained by a superior access to suitable plants and
animals for domestication.8 When the transition to sedentary agriculture was completed,
civilization very soon emerged with codied language, large public monuments, organized
religion, hierarchical power structures, and statehood. After having experienced thousands
of years in densely populated and intensely competitive agricultural states, it was only
natural that the Western colonial powers could dominate most of the world outside Eurasia
from 1500 CE onwards.
Later works such as Hibbs and Olsson (2004), Olsson and Hibbs (2005), Putterman
(2008), and Putterman and Weil (2010) take this analysis one step further and argue that
the timing of the transition to agriculture should still matter for comparative levels of
wealth and institutional development around the world. Indeed, when we use data from
Putterman (2006) on the date of rst transition to agriculture for all 152 countries in the
world and correlate that with log of GDP per capita in 2005, we nd a clear positive
relationship as in Figure 1. Results like these might thus be interpreted as giving support
to the idea that an early transition to Neolithic agriculture is advantageous to countries
even today.
However, this type of cross-country analysis has been criticized on the grounds that
independent agricultural transitions basically happened within a few "macroregions" in
the world such as Europe/Southwest Asia, East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and in three
di¤erent parts of America (Smith, 1995). For instance in Olsson and Hibbs (2005), the
analysis was based on data on access to suitable plants and animals for domestication
8Like Diamond (1997) and Morris (2010), the regions that we refer to as the "Western core" include
Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia including India and the countries west thereof.
All these regions were connected through trade and migration and based their economies on domesticated
plants and animals from the Fertile Crescent.
6
for six such macro regions. The di¢ culty of di¤erentiating between areas within macro
regions impeded a more complete analysis of the causality from biogeographical potential
to agriculture to levels of development in individual countries.
Furthermore, when considering the history of the rst macro region to make the tran-
sition to full-edged agriculture - the Western core - it is a striking fact that some of the
countries that once made up the cradle of agriculture and civilization in the "Fertile Cres-
cent" now are relatively much less developed than countries in the periphery of the macro
region. Take for instance Iraq and Syria, hosting some of the very earliest agricultural
villages known to exist (around 9,500 BCE) and some of the earliest signs of civilization
already by 4,000 BCE. Both countries are today close to being regarded as failed states
with a very weak rule of law, a long history of autocratic government (in Iraq, at least
until 2003), and stagnant economies. Compare that to for instance Sweden in the very
periphery of the European/Southwest Asian zone. Sweden adopted agriculture only 3500
BCE and did not host a state above tribal level until around 1150 CE. Despite this very
late start as a "civilization", Sweden (as well as most of its north European neighbors)
is now one of the most economically prosperous, egalitarian, and democratic countries in
the world.
Casual observations like these suggest that although the countries in the Western core
doubtlessly owe some of their relatively high average levels of development to their long his-
tory of agriculture and statehood, it is less apparent that an early transition to agriculture
was advantageous for comparative development within the macro region. Indeed, when
we use the same data as above on time since agricultural transition and contemporary
levels of GDP for 62 Western countries, there rather appears to be a negative relationship
between time since transition and GDP, as shown in Figure 1. Figure 2 displays this rela-
tionship in more detail. The unconditional negative relationship is moderately signicant
(t=-1.98).
Figure 2
How can we reconcile the two tendencies in the graphs above? This is what we turn
to in the section below.
2.2 Our model
In an extremely simplied sense, our basic model for explaining the negative reduced-form
relationship between current income and time since agriculture in the Western core can
be summarized by the following hypothesized causal relationship:
Early transition to agriculture =) Extractive institutions =) Weak current economic
performance
Late transition to agriculture =) Inclusive institutions =) Strong current economic
performance
7
Figure 3 below shows a more detailed exposition of our argument. It shows the timing
of transition to agriculture as the ultimate historical factor working through intermediate
channels to a¤ect current levels of economic performance. The horizontal axis shows a one-
dimensional geographic space divided into regions and the vertical axis a time dimension
where more recent times are found in the lower part of the gure.
Figure 3
Let us discuss each of these linkages in turn.
2.2.1 Early agriculture and extractive institutions
Firstly, specic geographical and biogeographical characteristics implied that the agricul-
tural transition happened rst in the Fertile Crescent. In this paper, we will not provide
an exhaustive analysis of the determinants of early adoption.9 We will conne ourselves to
noting a few main factors referred to in the literature: That people in the Fertile Crescent
had local access to several suitable plants and animals for domestication, the East-West
axis of the Eurasian landmass facilitated the spread of food technologies due to similar
mid-latitude climates (characterized by relatively wet winters and dry summers), the Fer-
tile Crescent was centrally located along this East-West axis, and the extended founder
area included rivers such as Euphrat, Tigris, the Jordan and the Nile that if properly
managed could provide a steady ow of water to an expanding agricultural population
(Diamond, 1997; Olsson and Hibbs, 2005). In our analysis, the date of transition will thus
to some extent inherently capture these specic geographical and biogeographical features.
It has often been suggested in the literature that there exists a strong link between the
timing of agriculture and the rise of statehood (Diamond, 1997; Peregrine et al, 2007). This
is also illustrated in Figure 3 where the rise of agriculture is a precursor to the subsequent
emergence of statehood. Using new data on initial state formation from Borcan et al
(2012) and a measure of average date of transition to agriculture that we have constructed
from Pinhasi et al (2005) (see presentation of these variables in the data section below),
we demonstrate a close relationship between the timing of the transitions to agriculture
and statehood among 52 Western countries in Figure 4. Each dot is a country observation
where the size of the dot increases with the level of GDP per capita in 2005. Visual
inspection immediately informs us that the correlation between agricultural and state
origins is very strong.
The estimated and signicant regression coe¢ cients for the simple bivariate association
between the two variables is given by Time since rst state formation = - 5179 + 1.043
x Average time since agricultural transition (R2 = 0:70), indicating that a country in the
Western core typically developed statehood about 5,200 years after the onset of agriculture.
9See for instance Smith (1995) or Diamond (1997) for general treatments and Ashraf and Michalopoulos
(2011) for an analysis of the role of climate variation.
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The slope coe¢ cient (close to unity) further implies that each year of delayed transition
to agriculture roughly implied a year later transition to statehood.10
Figure 4
An key argument in this model is that countries that made the transition to agriculture
and statehood early also tended to develop what might be referred to as "extractive
institutions" (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2012). Our denition of such extractive institutions
includes unstable, autocratic forms of government with a weak rule of law, a concentrated
wealth distribution largely controlled by an elite, and intense rent seeking activities, both
within the country as well as from foreign aggressors. By bringing order and a capacity
for collective action to previously anarchic hunter-gatherer societies, the initial economic
advantages of extractive institutions in the early civilizations were often substantial. Food
production was greatly rationalized which led to the emergence of specialized classes of
priests, warriors, merchants, book-keepers, and engineers. Massive public monuments were
erected and hordes of people from the countryside crowded into centrally planned cities.
But why and how did early agriculture lead to extractive institutions, as hypothesized
in Figure 3? We believe that there are at least four reasons for such a causal link. Firstly,
as mentioned above, the subsequent expansion of early agriculture into river valleys such
as those of Euphrat and Tigris in an otherwise very dry area, was only made possible
due to carefully coordinated collective irrigation activities involving the digging of dykes
and dams, the construction of river gates, and the planning of elds and orchards. As
discussed further in the Appendix section on Iraqi history, these collective action challenges
in production appear to be closely linked with the emergence and presence of centralized
local power. In a famous treatise, Wittfogel (1957) even claimed that river management
provided the fundament for the emergence of despotic states in Mesopotamia, Egypt and
China, and similar notions can be found in the works of Karl Marx and Adam Smith.
More recently, research by Elinor Ostrom and coauthors (see for instance Ostrom, 2010)
has shown that populations have often been able to solve social dilemmas such as irrigation
in an e¢ cient manner without the involvement of the state. However, in a cross-country
study, Bentzen et al (2012) demonstrate that irrigation potential in countries, proxied
by potential yield gain from irrigation, is strongly correlated with autocratic forms of
government. The result is robust to the inclusion of a range of control variables such as
latitude and the fraction of arable land. Their analysis suggests that although irrigation
might not necessarily give rise to states, countries with high irrigation potential tend to
be more autocratic than countries that rely on rain-fed agriculture.11
Secondly, the Euphrat-Tigris delta as well as the Nile riverbanks soon became densely
populated agricultural regions with a great accumulation of wealth in urban centers.12
10The t-value for the estimate of Average time since agricultural transition is 10.04 and for the constant
-7.02. See Borcan et al (2012) for a thorough analysis of this relationship.
11See also Jones (1981) who makes a similar point regarding the advantages of rain-fed agriculture.
12See Appendix 1 for a more exhaustive account of the comparative history of Iraq in light of our model.
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Such wealth naturally became a tempting target for more primitive populations in the
neighboring regions of the founder region. When agricultural technology in the form of
domesticated plants and animals and military technology featuring horses and bronze met-
allurgy had spread to these regions, they posed a mounting threat to the center. Very
early in history, the various state formations in Mesopotamia were attacked by predat-
ing barbarians. After the decline of the Sumerian cities in the third century BCE, the
Mesopotamian heartland became the prize in recurring conquest attempts by neighboring
peoples including the Persians (6th century BCE), the Greeks (4th century BCE), Ro-
mans (1st century CE), Arabs (7th century), Mongols (13th century) and Ottomans (16th
century). Being under constant threat of attack by invading foreign armies, the form of
government in the region had a natural bias towards autocratic, military rule. Although
some of the earliest known laws were codied in the area, the right of might was the order
of the day rather than the rule of law and protection of private property.
Thirdly, Mesopotamia was constantly threatened by invasion not only due to its
wealth. Being located right in the center of the European/Southwest Asian climate zone,
Mesopotamia was a very natural place for roaming armies to stop by in their moves along
the continents east-west axis. As described by Morris (2010), both the Chinese and West-
ern civilizations were frequently threatened by hordes from the central Asian steppes such
as Huns and Mongols. Also Egypt had huge accumulated wealth due to its productive
agriculture, but being located somewhat more isolated with surrounding deserts, Egypt
was relatively sheltered from attacks by roaming barbarians.13 The strong correlation
between the degree of centrality within the Western core and the timing of the transition
to agriculture implies that variables capturing the date of the Neolithic revolution also
will pick up geographical features, as suggested by Figure 3.
Fourthly, even though agriculture rst appeared in the semi-dry areas of the Fertile
Crescent, the relative advantage in terms of land fertility shifted northwestward as agri-
culture spread in this direction. In particular, the robust soils of continental Europe soon
proved to give substantial crop yields. The river management economies of the Middle
East, on the other hand, turned out to be quite ecologically sensitive. Agricultural lands in
the area were under constant threat of salinization and some sources have even suggested
that salinization was responsible for historical episodes of crop shifts and large-scale aban-
donment of certain settlements.14 As shown by Diamond (2005), overuse of resources and
ecological failures of this kind have often led to internal warfare and even social collapse.
Both the Egyptian and Mesopotamian river valleys were de facto circumscribed by desert,
which made easy escape routes di¢ cult for troubled farming populations. This probably
contributed to extra social conict in times of climate downturns.15
13Even Egypt was however a¤ected from time to time by invading armies. Already around 1650 BC,
the Hyksos, a Semitic people, could take control of the northern parts of the country. In later centuries,
also neighboring Nubians, Libyans, and Assyrians were attracted by the Egyptian wealth and managed to
install short-lived foreign regimes in the country.
14See Postgate (1995) for a discussion of these hypotheses. We owe the general point about ecological
sensitivity to a comment by Jared Diamond.
15Another potential reasons for the historical presence of extractive institutions in the Middle East, not
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As suggested by Figure 3, the thousands of years of agriculture and stratied societies
gradually resulted in a worsening culture of autocratic rule and low trust which has per-
sisted to the present day. In a companion paper to this one, Paik and Olsson (2012) show
that an early transition to agriculture is associated with stronger contemporary norms
towards obedience in the Western core. We argue that this culture was basically founded
on the institutions of society, which in turn were founded on the structure of production.
Hence, even groups that migrated into the agricultural heartlands of the Middle East soon
adopted the same extractive institutions that had prevailed among the local population
for millennia.
2.2.2 Later transitions and inclusive institutions
But even if the Middle East had all these special disadvantageous characteristics for long-
run institutional development, why should there also within Europe be a gradient such
that the timing of initial agriculture had a long-run impact on economic and institutional
development? In Western history, there appears to be a pattern of a northwestward march
of power; starting from the earliest city-states of 3500 BCE in the Fertile Crescent, power
shifted west to the Hittite Empire around 1400 BCE; then to Greece around 330 BCE,
when Alexander of Macedon conquered eastwards through the Fertile Crescent; then to
Rome around 240 BCE, with Romes conquest eastwards to Greece; then to western and
northwestern Europe, which became richer and more powerful than Italy.16 Our model
above suggests that while this shift may have been an outcome of successive waves of
predation by less developed neighbors on a center, each empire or state that emerged also
became progressively more innovative, learning from past experiences and mistakes.
As convincingly demonstrated by Bellwood (2005) and others, there are strong indi-
cations that Europe as well as the eastern parts of Southwest Asia were gradually settled
by Indo-European farmers spreading from the agricultural core in the Fertile Crescent via
Western Anatolia. Just like in more recent massive migrations (such as the emigration to
the United States in the 19th and 20th centuries), it was almost surely marginalized groups
without close access to power that ssioned o¤ and formed new agricultural communities.
The genetic record further suggests that these colonizing farmers interbred with local
hunter-gatherer populations (Bellwood, 2005). The egalitarian nature of hunter-gatherer
societies probably gave another impetus towards stronger equality among these early farm-
ers.17 A characteristic feature of the so-called Linear Bandkeramik-culture (LBK), which
spread along the Danube into central Europe and southern Germany by around 5400
BCE, was for instance a new tradition of villages with timbered longhouses hosting sev-
directly related to the transition to agriculture, includes the fact that countries in the area often became
parts of large empires, which have been shown to be associated with a weak rule of law (Olsson and
Hansson, 2011) and an absence of representative assemblies (Stasavage, 2011).
16See also Kennedy (1988) for a classic account of how power shifted northwards from around 1500 AD
in Europe.
17 In a very extensive combined study of primitive agricultural, horticultural, and hunting-gathering
societies around the world, Mulder et al (2009) provide empirical evidence of a substantially higher income
inequality among agricultural communities than among hunter-gatherers. See also Sahlins (1973).
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eral families, suggesting a relatively egalitarian social structure and a uid pattern of land
ownership (Bellwood, 2005).
Eventually, also many of these new communities would accumulate wealth in urban
centers and become the object of predatory attacks from more primitive neighbors. Wealth
accumulation, combined with exogenous threats and a growing population, thus typically
led to a gradual shift towards more autocratic rule also in these communities. However,
the historical tradition of autocratic rule would be weaker and less pervasive in these
societies than in the Middle East. Furthermore, the underlying geographical conditions in
most core areas of Europe (such as the absence of major river valleys and the reliance on
rain-fed agriculture) were still not as conducive to the maintenance of highly centralized,
autocratic, urban states as in the eastern Mediterranean.
Consider for instance the territory of Italy, a centrally located region in Europe and
of key historical importance for the history of the continent. The archaeological record
suggests that the peninsula was originally populated by Neolithic farmers from the Eastern
Mediterranean during the 7th millennium BCE.18 As shown in Figure 5, the rst sites are
predominantly found in the south-east. The north-central areas, roughly stretching from
current Florence to the Alps, was the region where agriculture emerged the latest after
5200 BCE.
Figure 5
In line with our theory, statehood and civilization appeared earlier in the south of
Italy than in the north. The rst major civilizations in Southern Italy and Sicily were
the Greek colonies that were founded during the 8th century BCE and implied that the
South became an integrated part of the classical Greek and later the Hellenic world.
The northern areas were dominated by Etruscan and Celtic tribes but did not develop
centralized states. After defeating the Greeks under Pyrrhus leadership in 275 BCE,
Rome conquered Southern Italy and emerged as the dominant power on the peninsula,
soon expanding also to conquer Sicily and the Northern parts. The area north of the
river Rubicon, including the Po valley, was organized as Gallia Cisalpina which remained
a Roman province until 41 BCE and was during these times not considered part of Italy
proper.
Italy during the Roman Republican era was clearly a society with more equally dis-
persed wealth and power than during the subsequent Imperial era (starting with the rule
of Augustus in 27 BCE). As recently emphasized by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), the
republican institutions with a senate as the center of power and with executive power in
the form of consuls on a one-year tenure, combined with o¢ ces for representatives of the
people such as tribunes, guaranteed a relatively widespread distribution of power. This
gradually changed with the emergence of powerful generals who would become more and
more inuential politically until they could rule as autocratic emperors in a similar style as
18The associated culture is referred to as "Cordial Ware" after its shell-impressed pottery and also spread
to other regions of the Mediterranean such as Southern France, Sardinia, and the Iberian coasts.
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many Eastern rulers before them. Although Imperial Rome was very successful economi-
cally at least until the late 2nd century CE, income inequality and rent seeking increased
and technological progress stalled (Morris, 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).
All of Italy was part of the Roman empire until 476 CE, when the Western part col-
lapsed as a result of predatory barbarian invasions. After some chaotic years, a pattern
would emerge from about 800 CE with northern Italy being under the control of the
Frankish and later Holy Roman empire, the center being controlled by the Papacy in
Rome, and with the south changing hands between various rulers. From about 1200, the
northwestern Italian regions in the Holy Roman empire splintered and became largely
independent. This period marked the beginning of the Renaissance era with its important
upswing in economic and cultural development. Cities like Genoa and Venice became dom-
inant players in the Mediterranean trade and several of the North Italian cities developed
representative assemblies, dominated by merchant families but still more inclusive than
elsewhere in Europe at the time (Stasavage, 2011).
From around 1500, Spain became a major inuence in southern Italy and for long
periods ruled over the area. The Spanish feudal institutions were quite di¤erent from
the institutions of northern Italy. Representative assemblies did not emerge during the
Renaissance in this part and when Italy was united in 1860, it was already clear that the
south was relatively backward, economically as well as institutionally.
To summarize, Italy clearly made the transition to agriculture later than in the Fertile
Crescent and experienced a later rise of statehood and autocratic rule during imperial
Roman times. But the peninsula as a whole still had a substantially shorter history of
autocratic rule than the regions in the eastern Mediterranean and the northern cities even
experienced periods of inclusive institutions.
Only in the most distant periphery of the western region, in Northwestern Europe, were
the conditions decidedly not conducive towards the early emergence of autocratic, central-
ized states. The shores of the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea were conquered quite
late by farmers and probably faced tough resistance from relatively prosperous hunter-
gatherers who lived well o¤ the rich aquatic resources in the area (Bellwood, 2005). For
instance, Denmark only made the transition to agriculture around 3500 BCE and to state-
hood 700 CE. Soils were further of poorer quality than on the North European plains which
hindered the emergence of urbanism and high population density.
Communities in this part of Europe were relatively protected from predatory attacks by
other peoples.19 Pagan Vikings from the Scandinavian countries raided several regions of
Europe around 800-1000 CE and Viking colonizers assumed power in Russia (Novgorod),
England, and Normandie. However, due to their geographical isolation and relatively
infertile soils, these North European regions were largely spared from attacks by invading
armies.20 Absent this constant military threat and with no ancient culture of autocratic
19See Ashraf et al (2010) for an analysis showing that geographically isolated societies in prehistory tend
to be relatively rich today. The authors argue that plausible channels for this relationship is protection
from predation and a stronger reliance on indigenous innovative activity.
20Sweden, for instance, fought many wars throughout its short history with the Danes and on the
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rule, the people in these areas could maintain relatively egalitarian institutions with a
stronger rule of law and with relatively inuential popular assemblies. With no substantial
concentrated wealth to capture, internal rent seeking and corruption never turned into a
serious problem and foreign powers remained uninterested in conquering the northern
areas.
In summary then, the countries that made the transition to agriculture rst also expe-
rienced a long history of unstable, autocratic rule with a weak rule of law, high inequality
and substantial rent seeking, internally and externally. The main reasons for this were
related to the close association between irrigation technology and centralized power, the
attraction of accumulated urban wealth on predatory neighboring peoples, their central
location between east and west, and the environmental degradation that the rst agricul-
tural areas soon experienced. In central and western Europe, there were both periods of
empires and autocratic rule as during the Roman and Frankish periods but also long pe-
riods of less autocratic states. In northern Europe, the transition to civilization happened
late and hierarchical institutions like those in the original agricultural zones were not ob-
served for any extensive periods. Authoritarian norms were never ingrained in society to
the same extent as in the early civilizations.
2.2.3 Institutions and economic performance
The last intermediate link between transition to agriculture and current economic perfor-
mance in Figure 3 is related to technological progress. In line with Acemoglu and Robin-
son (2012), we hypothesize that extractive institutions like those in the early agricultural
communities were hostile to technological progress and innovation in sectors outside agri-
culture. The irrigated agriculture of Mesopotamia or the colonial plantation economies of
the Caribbean are both examples of economies based on unfree labor. Also the Roman
and Greek economies in antiquity were based on slave labor. As argued by Mokyr (1990),
Sokolo¤ and Engermann (2000) and others, these economies provided weak incentives for
labor-saving innovations since labor was extremely cheap. Economic growth in such soci-
eties can still be impressive and is typically based on increased specialization and trade, as
in Mesopotamia or in Rome. But unless there are repeated major innovations and creative
destruction, economic development will sooner or later run into diminishing returns and
growth will not be sustained over the long run (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2012).
Finally, the last link in Figure 3 suggests that the inclusive institutions favoring tech-
nological innovation that were prevalent in the northern periphery, should imply a stronger
economic performance during the more recent stages of history. Analogously, the extractive
institutions and weak incentives for innovation that characterized the early agricultural
societies for several millennia, should imply a weak economic performance today. But
continent, but its heartlands were never overrun by a foreign army. Because of its recent neutrality, the
country has not been engaged in a single war during the last 200 years. See Appendix 1 for an extensive
analysis of Swedish history in a comparative perspective.
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when in history did the extractive economic institutions run into diminishing returns so
that the reversal became manifest? After all, polities based on extractive institutions such
as imperial Rome or Byzantium could thrive economically well into the Middle Ages.
From the point of our model, one would expect a reversal to start working in an
era characterized by a technological paradigm that rewarded individual innovative e¤orts
rather than central coordination. According to many accounts, the late Medieval period
between roughly 1100-1500 CE was such a period (Mokyr, 1990; Morris, 2010). As already
mentioned, the North Italian cities started to ourish culturally and economically during
this period. Similar developments took place further north in the Flandern region. Also
Dutch and North German cities became important centers of manufacturing and trade.
Representative assemblies appeared and both science and technology made great strides.
As will be shown below, by 1500 CE, countries that made a late transition to agriculture
and civilization had become the rst to develop inclusive institutions, which in turn had
given them a decisive economic edge by the start of the Modern era compared to competing
nations further south.
Figure 4 summarizes one of the basic empirical ndings of the paper. Among the 52
Western countries in the gure, there is a clear pattern that countries that transited early
to agriculture and statehood tend to be poorer today. The majority of the large circles
(rich countries) are found in the lower-left corner of the gure, for instance most of the
Scandinavian and North European countries, whereas the Middle Eastern countries are
typically in the upper-right corner. We will return to more elaborate empirical tests of our
model, using both countries and smaller regions as observations, in the empirical section
below.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
The key explanatory variable in the empirical analysis is the time since the Neolithic
transition.21 We develop a new variable Average time since agricultural transition for
regions as well as for countries in the Western zone. In doing so, we use a sample of
calibrated C14-dates from Neolithic sites in the Near East and Europe available from
Pinhasi (2005). The data contains a full list of excavation sites (765 in total) that spans
from the Fertile Crescent to Northwest Europe; the list includes the location coordinates
as well as calibrated C14-dates estimated for each site. The oldest site in the sample
is Mlefaat, near Mosul in Northern Iraq, dating back 12,811 years. Figure 6 shows the
geographical distribution of all sites in the sample.
Figure 6
21Appendice 4-6 show the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the cross-regional, within Italy,
and cross-country studies.
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The use of a detailed set of carbon-dates spread across Europe allows for a measure of
the initial agricultural adoption dates for each specic region in consideration. The average
initial date of agricultural adoption is obtained by using the inverse distance weighting
method and zonal statistics in ArcGIS. Appendix 2 shows the inverse distance formula
used for the calculation. For the analysis, we obtain the average adoption date for each
region or country by rst interpolating the point data across the excavation sites and then
calculating the mean date within the administrative border. Figure 5 shows an example
of this methodology applied to the 78 Neolithic sites within Italy.
Taking the year 2000 as the benchmark year, the mean time since agricultural transition
in our cross-regional sample is 7,055 years with a range from 5,243 to 11,320 (Appendix
4). This of course translates into a mean adoption date of 5,055 BCE and a rst adoption
date of 9,320 BCE. In the cross-country sample, the mean is 7,611 years, the minimum is
5,608 (Denmark) and the maximum 9,743 (Syria) (see Appendix 6).
Most cross-country studies that include the time since Neolithic transition as a vari-
able have so far used the cross-country data set in Putterman (2006). For each country,
Putterman (2006) determines a date of transition by using the rst attested date of Ne-
olithic agriculture within the countrys borders as stated by various specialized sources.
We believe that our methodology o¤ers several advantages as compared to Putterman
(2006). As far as we know, the data in Pinhasi et al (2005) o¤er the most recent and
most comprehensive compilation of transition dates for the Western region. Furthermore,
our methodology provides the average date of transition for a country rather than the
rst date of transition, as in Putterman (2006).22 We believe that this practice will more
accurately reect the transition for the whole country since there might be large discrep-
ancies in dates of transition between regions within countries, as also acknowledged by
Putterman (2006). With our methodology, it is further possible to determine transition
dates on a much ner geographical level.
We further introduce a novel set of data measuring Neolithic vegetation variation at
the advent of the Neolithic Revolution. The Neolithic vegetation states are indicators of
soil quality during the prehistoric period. The data on the Neolithic vegetation variables
for Europe is based on the maps from Adams-Faure (1997) and Oak Ridge National Lab-
oratorys Environmental Sciences Division (www.esd.ornl.gov/projects/qen). Appendix 3
provides details on how the vegetation map is constructed, including the methodology used
to address the endogeneity issue of human subsistence inuencing prehistoric vegetation
state prior to agriculture. The vegetation types listed on the maps are ranked from the
best to worst in terms of agricultural suitability.23 Each observation records the fraction
22We average over the calculated scores for each region within countries to get the country score. The
regional scores are used in the regional analysis.
23The vegetation types are dened as follows. 1. Desert: very sparsely vegetated. 2. Dry Steppe:
similar to Steppe-Tundra, with a more temperate climate, open woody vegetation types and low shrubs.
3. Ice. 4. Lake. 5. Polar Desert: very sparsely vegetated with only low herbaceous plants. 6. Semi-Desert:
open scrub/grassland. 7. Steppe-Tundra: sparse ground cover, herbaceous with a few low shrubs. 8.
(Warm) Temperate Forest: fairly tall, many broad-leaved evergreen/semi-deciduous angiosperm trees but
moisture-requiring conifers also tend to be abundant. 9. Wooded Steppe (Cool Temperate Forest): closed
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of each vegetation type occupying the unit of land, summing up to one. In the follow-
ing empirical analysis, Neolithic vegetation control is a set of the fractions of each region
occupied by eleven di¤erent Neolithic vegetation types. The geographical distribution of
vegetation types in the Western core 10,000 years ago, is shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7
Finally, the roots of European growth is commonly seen in the Roman Empire (Landes,
1998, Jones, 1981), while the presence of Ottoman rule may have eradicated some nations
Roman traditions (Kuran, 2011) and the access to the Atlantic Ocean may have opened
up trade opportunities and subsequent rise to economic powers among European nations
(Acemoglu et al, 2005b). The Ottoman empire during its greatest expansion in the 17th
Century also coincides with the spread of Islam. Blaydes and Chaney (2012) argue that
Mamlukism - or the use of military slaves by Muslim sultans - beginning in the 8th
century following the end of Roman hegemony, led to a process of political divergence
in the Christian and Muslim worlds. The authors argue that the forms of executive
constraint which emerged under Carolingian feudalism led to increased political stability,
while Muslim sultans reliance on mamlukism limited the bargaining strength of local
vassal lords and led to ine¤ective executive constraint and shorter duration of rule. Under
this argument, we would expect the long history of Mamlukism, which lasted up to the
19th century, must have negatively inuenced the political stability of Islamic regions
under the Ottoman rule, and under the Byzantine rule.
To investigate whether these heritage and geographical factors are important, we obtain
indicator variables for whether a region was part of these empires or was an Atlantic
trader, by using the Euratlas (2011) historical georeferenced vectorial data. This set of
data provides a series of maps describing the history of sovereign boundaries from 0 CE to
2000 CE for every hundred years, delineating the boundaries of the Roman, Byzantine and
Ottoman empires. The variables used in the cross-country analysis give the fraction of the
countrys territory that was part of the empires in question at the time when the empires
reached their peak (Rome in 200 CE, Byzantine empire in 500 CE and the Ottoman empire
in 1600 CE). Atlantic coastline to area-ratio is taken from Acemoglu et al (2005b) and
provides a measure of a countrys exposure to the Atlantic and hence its potential for
Atlantic trade.
The dependent variable in our regional and Italian analysis is the mean intrastate
GDP per capita from Eurostat (2012) from 1997 to 2008. The level of disaggregation is
NUTS-3, which gives a total number of 1,371 available observations for 30 countries. The
dependent variable in the cross-country section is GDP per capita in 2005 from World
Development Indicators.
forest, including mixed conifer-broad-leaved forest. 10 Forest Steppe: mainly herbaceous steppe, but with
scattered clumps of trees or bushes in favourable pockets. 11. Montane Desert (Polar and Alpine Desert/
Dry Sparse Tundra): very sparsely vegetated with only low herbaceous plants/ mainly herbaceous or with
low shrubs.
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3.2 Econometric strategy
In our model in Section 2, we outlined a theory including three basic causal linkages: 1.
Time since transition to agriculture)2. Institutions ) 3. Current economic performance.
In our econometric framework, we will mainly use data on 1 and 3 and we recognize that
some of the institutional factors in 2, involving the often long historical experiences of
countries and regions, are not always readily observable. The main focus of our attention
will be on assessing the impact of the times since the transitions to agriculture on economic
and institutional outcome variables that we have the most reliable measures on.
We will most often run reduced-form equations of the very simple form
Yi = 0 + 1Ti + 2Xi + i (1)
where Yi is income per capita in region or country i in our Western sample, Ti is the
time since agricultural transition, Xi is a vector of control variables, and i is a normally
distributed error term. The parameter of interest in this setting is of course 1, showing the
reduced-form impact of agricultural history on economic performance. In the case when
Yi refers to the current income per capita of some country or regions, our hypothesis is
1 < 0, i.e. an adverse long-run impact of agricultural experience on economic prosperity.
A key identifying assumption in this setup is of course that Yi did not in any way
inuence Ti. As has been discussed in previous chapters, once agriculture was invented in
the Fertile Crescent, it gradually spread towards the northwest in a fairly regular pattern.
Even regions with a similar biogeography such as Turkey and Spain experienced very
di¤erent dates of adoption on the basis of their distance to the Fertile Crescent. Although
local geographical and climatic conditions no doubt played a role in this di¤usion (see
for instance Ashraf and Michalopoulos, 2011), we think there are no good reasons to
believe that current or historical levels of income per capita should have a¤ected the date
of agricultural transition. Agriculture typically appeared in a region as an exogenous
intervention introduced by migrating agricultural populations.
3.3 Results
In this section we document the negative, reduced-form relationship between time since
agricultural transition and levels of current economic performance. In the cross-country
part, we also analyze the historical evolution of this relationship and make an assessment
of the importance of institutions as an intermediate link. We use three levels of analysis:
1,371 European NUTS-3 regions, 107 regions within Italy, and lastly a cross-country study
of 64 Western countries.
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3.3.1 Cross-regional analysis
Table 1 shows the results for the cross-regional analysis among 1,371 Western regions
in 30 European countries.24 In the rst six specications, the coe¢ cient value for the
agricultural adoption date variable is strongly negative and statistically signicant, even
though the magnitude of the coe¢ cient drops when the set of Neolithic vegetion variables
are included in Columns 3-6.
Table 1
The estimate of the adoption date variable in Column 1 (measured in units of 1000
years) suggests that an earlier transition to agriculture by 1000 years implies an approxi-
mately 50 percent decrease in the current income level. When the Neolithic biogeography
is controlled for, this magnitude drops by about 12 points, and further by 17 points when
a set of historical empire controls are included. Under Column 6, the coe¢ cient value of
-0.198 still suggests that a 1,000 year earlier transition to agriculture decreases the GDP
per capita by about 20 percent. This main result suggests that the timing of agriculture
during the Neolithic period has a negative inuence on the current economic standing in
a region, independent of the Neolithic biogeography, subsequent empire inuences, as well
as access to the Atlantic Ocean (AJR 2005), the regions latitude, and communist rule.
Table 1 also includes a battery of geographical and biogeographical controls. In par-
ticular, we use variables capturing the fraction of di¤erent vegetation types in the regions
10,000 years ago, as shown in Figure 7. We also use variables capturing the regions his-
torical belonging to various empires, as well as access to the Atlantic. Our results suggest
that a higher GDP per capita is strongly associated with territorially smaller regions, with
an icy climate in prehistory, and with a location inside the historical borders of the Roman
empire. On the other hand, income levels have a signicant negative relationship with a
Semi-desert vegetation and an inclusion in the former Byzantine or Ottoman empires.
The negative and signicant relationship between income levels and agricultural transi-
tions dates is however not robust to including country xed e¤ects in Column 7. Hence, we
cannot rule out that variation between countries is driving the regional results in Columns
1-6. In order to investigate this issue in more detail, we conduct the following analysis in
two ways. First, we run an in-depth analysis of within-state variation by focusing only
on one country - Italy - for reasons explained below. Second, we carry out an extensive
cross-country analysis to explore the reduced-form relationship further and to analyze the
channels through which the timing of agricultural adoption inuenced modern outcomes
at the country level.
3.3.2 Italy
Italy provides a suitable setting for which the above hypothesis can be tested. Its geograph-
ical location on an axis from southeast to northwest gives it the same spatial orientation
24Please see Appendix 4 for further details about the variables included in the analysis.
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as the direction of the historical spread of agriculture across the continent, as shown in
Figure 6. The country is geographically placed in the middle of the agricultural spread
and in the Mediterranean region, made up the core area of the Roman Empire, and has a
rich set of 78 archaeological sites to infer local di¤usion of agriculture. Furthermore, the
country is divided into 134 di¤erent regions, 107 of which we have income data for com-
parison. These regions have also been the focus of institutional and cultural research for
their varying institutional performance despite close proximity to each other and despite
belonging to the same country for about 150 years.25 The broad contours of the countrys
history since the Neolithic were presented in Section 2.
The maps in Figures 9-10 show the average dates of transition to agriculture and aver-
age income levels per capita, respectively. The southern regions adopted agriculture early
on, while northern regions adopted agriculture later, an observation which is consistent
with the pattern of di¤usion in the rest of the European continent. In particular, the
north-central regions of Italy were late to adopt and are now the wealthiest areas of the
country. Visual inspection suggests that there is a strong negative correlation between
date of transition in Figure 9 and current income per capita in Figure 10.
Figures 8-9
Table 2 presents a set of regression results which again shows a consistent nding
of higher income related to later adopting regions. The results remain signicant even
after controlling for the Neolithic biogeography. Note also that the result is not driven
by a simple north-south di¤erence; Latitude is positive and signicant as expected in the
table but its inclusion only a¤ects the magnitude of the estimate for Average time since
agricultural transition, not its level of signicance.
Table 2
3.3.3 Cross-country analysis
The main results for the cross-country analysis are shown in Table 3. The sample includes
64 Western countries in Europe, Middle East, North Africa, and Southwestern Asia that
belonged to the Western core of agricultural di¤usion. The cross-country sample thus
contains more than twice as many countries as in the cross-regional analysis. Appendix 6
provides descriptive statistics for the included variables.
25See for instance Baneld (1958) and Putnam (1993). Baneld (1958) studies the e¤ect of culture on
the success of institutions in these regions. The author nds "familial amoralism" as the dominant ethos in
Montegrano in Southern Italy: "Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume
that all others will do otherwise." The result of such cultural values, according to Baneld, is the main
cause for the backwardness in Southern Italy.
Following Baneld, Putnam (1993) refers to the absence of "civic virtue," or the character of the citizens
showing "interest in public issues and devotion to public causes" (Walzer, 1992), as the main determinant
for the lack of institutional performance in the southern regions of Italy. Importantly, the author traces
the di¤erences of institutional performances in South and Northern Italy back to the year 1100, arguing
that Northern Italys merchant ruling class with horizontal social networks and active social involvement
led to better institutional performance than the South, a region marked by a history of autocratic rulers.
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Table 3
As is clear from the table, Average time since agricultural transition in the Western
core has consistently a negative and signicant impact on log income per capita in 2005.
Like in the previous tables, we also include a number of geographical control variables
such as country area, the percent of arable land, and the average altitude of the country.
Interestingly, Log Arable land is negative and signicant in Columns 2-4, but not in the
other columns.
Obviously, the countries in our Western sample have been strongly a¤ected by other
historical events apart from their transition to Neolithic agriculture. Starting in Column
3, we try to account for some of these other inuences by including variables proxying for
the inuence of Atlantic trade (Atlantic coastline to area-ratio), the impact of being part
of the Roman, Byzantine, and Ottoman empires (measured as the fraction of a countrys
territory within each empire at the time of their maximum extension), and whether the
country was a previous Warsaw pact, East European country or a former Soviet republic.
In the full Western sample, former Roman countries appear to have higher GDP and
former communist countries have a substantially lower GDP.
When the standard set of controls (used in tables below) is employed as in Column 4,
time since agricultural transition is still negative and signicant. The conditional scatter
plot for this regression is shown in Figure 10. The point estimate (-0.64) indicates that
a 1,000-year earlier transition to agriculture would have implied a 64 percent lower GDP
per capita. The numbers imply that if a country close to the mean time since transition
such as Italy had experienced the transition to agriculture in 6,300 BCE instead of in the
actual year 5,300 BCE, their GDP per capita in 2005 would have been 6,979 $US instead
of 19,386 $US. The economic signicance is thus also quite strong.
Figure 10
A potential objection to using the full Western sample is that it includes a quite
heterogenous group of countries, mixing European states with North African and Middle
Eastern countries. In Columns 5 and 6, we therefore restrict our sample to 40 European
countries. Within Europe, the former communist dummy is very signicant, as expected,
but so is time since agricultural transition. In Columns 7 and 8, we restrict the sample
even further to only include 31 countries that had more than 50 percent of its territory
within the Roman empire in year 200 CE. These countries shared a similar institutional
and cultural context during a very formative period of Western history. The precision of
the estimates for our main explanatory variable is even better in this sample.
In Table 4, we check the robustness of our results in a number of ways. We start
by using two alternative measures of time since agricultural transition. First, we include
Time since agricultural transition from Putterman (2006) which so far has been the main
variable used in research for measuring time since the agricultural transition in cross-
country studies. This variable is also negative and signicant at the 10 percent-level in
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Column 1 but not in Column 2 when control variables are included. Second, instead of
taking the average value of transition to agriculture within countries, we use the earliest
evidence of Neolithic agriculture in a country from the Pinhasi et al (2005) data.26 The
estimates for this variable are negative and signicant in Columns 3 and 4. Hence, the
main tendency in the results do not seem to be driven by the particular choice of proxy
for time since the agricultural transition.
Table 4
In Columns 5-6, we exclude all countries in the sample that do not have at least one
of the 765 site observations from Pinhasi et al (2005) within their borders. In this way, we
restrict the sample to country observations with a greater precision in the measurement
of the date of agricultural transition. Reassuringly, in this smaller sample of 44 countries,
the t-values for the negative estimates of Average time since agricultural transition are
very high.
In Column 7, we use the whole sample of available Western countries again and in-
troduce the standard control variables from the recent study by Ashraf and Galor (2012):
Log Arable Land, Log Latitude, and Log Suitability for Agriculture. The latter variable
was originally developed by Michalopoulos (2012) and is calculated as a country average
from geospatial data on grid cell level on soil and climate suitability for agriculture. Log
Land Suitability for Agriculture is never signicant in columns 7-9 and even changes sign.
Also Log Latitude changes sign and although Average time since agricultural transition in-
evitably is positively correlated with latitude, the former variable is consistently negative
and signicant at the 10-percent level in columns 7-9.
In columns 8-9, we also include the fraction of a countrys territory covered by dif-
ferent vegetation types 10,000 years ago. Although we recognize that biogeography to an
important extent inuenced the timing of the agricultural transition, we believe it is still
an informative exercise to assess the inuence of the timing of transition when holding
vegetation types constant. For instance, we can see from Figure 7 that whereas current
Turkey and Spain shared a similar biogeography (Dry and Wooded Steppe), Spain made
the transition almost 2000 years later (9,323 and 7,381 years ago respectively). In Col-
umn 8, only four of these biogeographical variables are signicant at a lower level than 10
percent but none remain so in Column 9.27
When the whole set of 17 geographical, biogeographical and historical control variables
are included as in Column 9, we see that only Log Latitude is still positive and moderately
signicant. Even in this extremely challenging horse race, the coe¢ cient for Average
time since agricultural transition remains negative and signicant at the 10-percent level.
Given these results, we nd it very unlikely that our main explanatory variable is mainly
26See Appendix 6 for the descriptive statistics regarding this variable. Compared to the Average date of
transition, the cross-country mean level of Earliest date of transition is 835 years higher.
27Note that the estimates for vegetation variables that are never signicant in the regressions are not
displayed in the table.
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capturing land quality characteristics. If these geographical variables have a long-run
impact on economic development, this impact appears to run through the timing of the
Neolithic.
When did this reversal happen in the Western world? There are at least two strands
in the literature arguing for a great divergence happening in the Western world after 1500
CE. Acemoglu et al (2005b) demonstrate that Atlantic trading nations, benetting from
the newly opened colonial trade, surged ahead of other countries and regions in Europe
after 1500. The second and very signicant shift was the Industrial Revolution, starting
around 1750, which even further contributed to the economic and technological dominance
of Britain and other north European countries (Mokyr, 1990; Acemoglu and Robinson,
2012). A key question in our analysis is thus if the reversal since the Neolithic was visible
already by 1500?
For the Malthusian era, it is widely accepted that population density is a good indicator
for the level of economic development in a country (Ashraf and Galor, 2011). In Table
5, Columns 1-3, we use population density in years 1, 1000 and 1500 CE as dependent
variables. In year 1, the reversal does not seem to be in place since the estimate for
Average time since agricultural transition is positive. In 1000 CE, the estimate is negative
but insignicant. However, by 1500, the reversal is evident since time since agricultural
transition in that year has turned negative.
Table 5
In Columns 4-6, we instead use Log GDP per capita from the same time periods as the
dependent variables. The sample is now limited to only 21-24 countries and the data on
historical income levels is once again taken from Ashraf and Galor (2012). A quite similar
pattern emerges in these regressions. The time since agricultural transition even has a
positive and signicant inuence on income in year 1000 CE, whereas the reversal is in
full play by 1500 CE in Column 6. Interestingly, the same dynamic of a reversal by 1500
CE appears in Columns 7-8 where the dependent variable is an indicator for the average
level of technological sophistication, taken from Comin et al (2010).
The results in Table 5 strongly suggests that the historical heritage from the Neolithic
turned from being an asset to Western countries levels of development as late as 1000
CE, to being a drag only 500 years later, and from then on until today. In Table 6,
we investigate the time period 1000-1500 CE further by using the population and GDP
per capita growth rates as the dependent variables. As expected, Average time since
agricultural transition has a statistically signicant negative inuence on both population
and GD per capita growth rates during the period. Since the initial levels of population
density and income levels are included in Columns 2 and 4, this is not a simple convergence
e¤ect.
Table 6
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In gure 11, we show the bivariate association between GDP growth and time since
agricultural transition from the specication in Table 6, Column 3. The t among these 21
countries is rather high with a R2 of 0.52. Not surprisingly, Renaissance Italy and Belgium
are outliers with superior growth rates. In the upper left corner are the North European
countries and in the lower right, the early civilizations with weak growth. The point
estimate of -0.0347 in Column 3 implies that a 1000 year earlier transition to agriculture
is associated with an annual growth rate that is 0.0347 percentage units lower. This might
seem like a small e¤ect but during this medieval period, when the mean annual growth rate
in our sample was a modest 0.069 percent, the economic signicance was not negligible.
Figure 11
We do not interpret these results as evidence against the critical roles played by Atlantic
trade, the Reformation, and the Industrial Revolution. Undoubtedly, these fundamental
processes contributed very importantly to the great divergence that made Britain and its
northern followers so much richer than the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries.
What we do suggest, however, is that the process of reversing fortunes in the Western world
seems to have followed an older trajectory rooted in the Neolithic which has previously not
been recognized and which seems to have become manifest already during the Medieval
period. We leave it for future research to investigate further why the reversal happened
in 1000-1500 CE and not in some other period.
In Table 7, lastly, we analyze the inuence of Average time since agricultural transition
on our intermediate variable; historical and current levels of institutional quality. If our
hypothesis is correct, we should observe that by 1500 CE, time since the Neolithic should
already have a negative inuence on democratic and private property-related institutions.
In Row 1, the dependent institutional variable is Executive constraints in 1500 CE, taken
from Acemoglu et al (2005b), and believed to capture to what extent governments were
constrained from expropriating private property. As predicted, Average time since agri-
cultural transition has a negative impact on Executive constraints in 1500, meaning that
later adopting countries had stronger institutions already by this time.
Table 7
In Rows 2-3, we include State antiquity index 1500-1950 from Puttermans (2010) data
set as an indicator of the level of statehood during the Modern Era. A recurring argument
in the literature is that European states strengthened power over their territories in the
Modern Era, which in turn created a foundation for later economic development. Columns
2-3 show that countries that more recently transited into agriculture also experienced the
emergence of stronger states in the post-1500 period.
Columns 4-9 have contemporary institutions as the dependent variable. These variables
arguably captures the essence of what our model denes as extractive institutions; the
level of rent seeking in society (Corruption in 2010 ), income inequality (Gini coe¢ cient
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in 2000 ), and the level of democracy/autocracy (Democracy in 2010 ).28 Given the path
dependency of many institutional indicators, we also expect that the current levels should
be correlated with historical levels, although we unfortunately do not have comparable
historical measures readily available to test this argument.
As we see from the table, countries that made the agricultural transition early tend
to have relatively more corruption, be strongly autocratic, and have a substantial income
inequality. This does not change when control variables are included. A potential objection
to this analysis is that the institutional variables used above mainly capture the formal
rules or compliance to rules at a specic and recent point in time. For instance, the scores
for Democracy in 2010 are obtained from the Polity data set where scores can sometimes
change drastically from year to year for a specic country. In a companion paper (Paik
and Olsson, 2012), we specically investigate the impact of the transition to agriculture on
informal institutions and cultural norms that are likely to change in a much slower fashion.
Our results show for instance that norms towards obedience are also more prevalent in
regions that transited early, in line with our model.
4 External validity and an extended model
Is this model then only applicable to the Western core or have there been similar reversals
elsewhere, as suggested by Figure 1? Outside Europe, the colonial era has been regarded as
central for understanding the comparative development of countries. Acemoglu et al (2002)
observe a reversal of fortune among former colonies in the sense that countries that had a
high population density and a high urbanization rate in 1500 CE are relatively poor now.
Like Sokolo¤ and Engerman (2000), Acemoglu et al (2002) emphasize the importance of
di¤erential colonial strategies for understanding this outcome: In regions that were already
wealthy and had a dense population, colonizers installed extractive institutions involving
massive plunder of mineral riches and forced labor, whereas Westerners settled themselves
and established strong property rights in less densely populated colonies.
Clearly, it can easily be argued that the higher population density and wealth in certain
former colonies was actually due to an earlier transition to agriculture. Acemoglu et al
(2002, p 248) compare for instance the cases of Bolivia and Argentina. According to their
estimates, Bolivia was seven times as densely populated as Argentina in 1500, whereas
Argentina is a lot richer today. However, the main reason for this substantial di¤erence
in population density in pre-Columbian times is the very di¤erent agricultural histories
of the two countries. Western Bolivia was part of the Andean highland civilization that
made the transition to agriculture around 2000 BCE, based on the cultivation of squash,
beans, potato, and avocado (Bellwood, 2005). The dominant city of Tiwanaku hosted
between 15,000-30,000 people already in 600 CE (Kolata, 1993). Argentina, on the other
hand, was peripheral to the major early civilizations and the largely nomadic tribes in the
28Note that higher values imply more inequality in the Gini coe¢ cient-variable, whereas higher values
imply less corruption and autocracy in the Corruption- and Democracy -variables.
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area only developed primitive agriculture. In pre-Columbian times, no urban settlement
hosted more than a few thousand people.
Hariri (2012) likewise argues and demonstrates empirically that regions outside Europe
that had a long history of agriculture and of statehood tended to provide a stronger
resistance to the colonial powers when they rst appeared after 1492. Some of the oldest
civilizations, like China and Ethiopia, were never colonized at all. Unfortunately, this
also meant that their highly autocratic institutions were resistant to Western ideas of
democracy and inclusive institutions that were transplanted to many countries with weaker
indigenous state formations (like Australia and Argentina). In this way, early agriculture
again implied a curse to long-run development.
In this paper, we have focused on establishing a causal relationship for the Western core
where we also have a rich archaeological data set to base our analysis on. A similar data
set as Pinhasi et al (2005) does not exist for other parts of the world, as far as we know.
Hence, we cannot undertake identical studies outside Western Eurasia with the same level
of condence. In addition, Eurasia consists of countries with almost entirely indigenous
populations. Samples obtained from populations of anthropological interests have been in
place before the great diaspores started in the 15th and 16th centuries. Since population
admixtures became the norm after this period, especially in the Americas, it is imperative
to take further precautions and look at a continent where such admixture is minimized. As
supporting evidence, Putterman and Weil (2010) nd that along with almost all of Africa
and Asia, Europe is a continent of countries with almost entirely indigenous populations.
In contrast, countries of like Australia, New Zealand and Canada have populations that
are overwhelmingly of European origin, and some others (Central American and Andean
countries) have both large Amerindian and substantial European-descended populations.
As in Figure 1, it is possible to use the dates provided by Putterman (2006) in order
to get an idea of what the relationship between agricultural transition and current levels
of income has been elsewhere. From a theoretical point of view, there are strong reasons
to believe that the same pattern of an early transition to agriculture, followed by auto-
cratic rule, rent seeking, inequality, technological backwardness, and ultimately stagnant
economic development has also prevailed within other agricultural core areas.
In Figure 12, we look at the unconditional correlation between log GDP per capita
in 2005 and Puttermans measure of agricultural transition among 41 countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa. All these countries are part of the Sub-Saharan zone where agriculture
spread mainly from an early core in the Sahel (Diamond, 1997; Bellwood, 2005). As the
gure shows, there is a robust and surprisingly strong negative relationship. Northeast
African states like Sudan (SDN) and Ethiopia (ETH) are among the countries that made
the transition rst and are very poor today, whereas latecomers such as Mauritius (MUS)
and Botswana (BWA) are a lot richer. In Mauritius, agriculture did not appear until 362
years ago, according to Puttermans (2006) estimates. Ethiopia, on the other hand, is one
of the oldest persistent statehoods in the world and is yet one of the poorest countries on
earth.
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Figure 12
The pattern in Central and East Asia is described by Figure 13. The simple relationship
is clearly negative and signicant at the 10-percent level.29 China (CHN) was the rst
country to adopt agriculture and is somewhat richer than predicted by the model, whereas
Japan (JPN) and Singapore (SGP) are late adopters that are relatively rich in an Asian
comparison.
Figure 13
In the Americas, any analysis of a relationship between transition to agriculture and
current income levels is extremely complicated due to the demographic shift that happened
there since 1500 CE. It is a well-known fact that disease and hardship caused a very large
fraction of the native Indian population to become extinct and be replaced by European
immigrants and slaves from West Africa. Hence, we refrain from drawing any conclusions
on the basis of the American case.
In Figure 1, we combine the regression predictions for the relationship between Put-
termans (2006) Time since agricultural transition and Log GDP per capita in 2005 from
Figures 2, 12, and 13. The graph shows the positive tted relationship for the whole
sample as well as the negative tted relationships for the Western, Sub-Saharan African,
and East Asian subsamples. Although one should be careful about overinterpreting these
bivariate associations, the pattern does seem to support our hypothesis regarding the links
between agricultural transition and current levels of development.
In line with the Diamond-model as tested in Hibbs and Olsson (2004), Olsson and
Hibbs (2005), and Putterman and Weil (2010), the average Western country has a higher
GDP per capita than the average country within other agricultural core regions. As
indicated by the gure, a country on the middle of the Western regression line made a
transition about 7,000 BP and has a log of GDP per capita of about 8.6 (5,430 $US).
An equivalent mid-range country in East Asia made the transition somewhat later, by
about 6,500 BP, and has a much lower log GDP per capita at about 7.5 (1,810 $US).
The equivalent numbers for Sub-Saharan Africa are roughly 2,600 BP and a log of GDP
at 6.24 (515 $US). We argue that these large continental di¤erences in average levels of
development can be well explained by the advantages of a superior biogeography and
geography and an earlier transition to agriculture and civilization in the Western core, as
argued by Diamond (1997). However, within the Western core, the relationship is clearly
negative, as discussed above.30
The gure provides a way of reconciling the Jared Diamond-hypothesis with the in-
stitutional reversal-hypothesis outlined in this analysis. To a great extent, the positive
relationship for the whole sample is driven by the successive negative relationships for the
29Clearly, a negative convex curve would have given a stronger t to the data points in the graph.
30 It is noteworthy that almost all Western countries had already made the transition when the rst
regions in Sub-Saharan Africa did.
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Western, East Asian and Sub-Saharan African cores. Although the evidence from East
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are clearly inconclusive at this stage, they are consistent with
the basic pattern demonstrated for our Western sample. We believe that the relationships
that emerge from Figure 1 might serve as the basis for a new hypothesis regarding the
long-run impact of early agriculture.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we argue that whereas countries that made the transition to agriculture early
tend to be relatively rich in a worldwide comparison, there is a reversal of fortune within
the agricultural core regions in the sense that early adopting countries tend to be poorer
today than the countries in the periphery of the core. Our model suggests that the reason
for this reversal is that countries and regions that made the transition to agriculture early
tended to develop autocratic, unstable states early in history, characterized by rent seeking,
inequality, and technological inertia, while later adopting regions had more democratic
forms of government, less rent seeking, and a greater social equality.
In the empirical section, we demonstrate that there is a strong negative association be-
tween time since transition to agriculture and current income levels in regressions featuring
1,371 European regions, in a study of 107 Italian regions, as well as in a cross-country
analysis of Western countries. We also show that time since agricultural transition is as-
sociated with early statehood, high corruption, autocratic forms of government, and great
inequality. Importantly, the economic, institutional, and technological reversal appears to
have been in place already in 1500 CE, i.e. before Western colonization and industrial-
ization. Hence, the very large income di¤erences that emerged during the last 500 years
seem to be partly rooted in development trajectories dating back to the Neolithic.
Our analysis ends with a brief investigation of the external validity of our hypothesis
outside the Western core. Preliminary ndings from Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia,
as well as our interpretation of the existing literature, strongly suggest a positive associa-
tion between time since agricultural transition and current income on a worldwide basis,
combined with a negative association within core areas. The ndings also warrant a more
careful analysis in the future of the links between agricultural transition and long-run
economic development outside the Western core.
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Figure 1: Relationship between log GDP per capita in 2005 and time since agricultural transition in total 
sample and within the Western, Sub-Saharan African, and East Asian cores. 
 
Note: The figure combines four fitted lines for separate OLS regressions using the full sample of observations 
(N=158), the Western sample (N=62), the East Asian sample (N=22), and the Sub-Saharan African sample (N=41). 
See figures 2, 12, and 13 for parameter estimates and other information about the separate regressions. The color of 
each country indicates whether it belongs to the Western, East Asian, Sub-Saharan African, or Other category. Time 
since agricultural transition is taken from Putterman (2006).  
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Figure 2: Relationship between log GDP per capita in 2005 and time since agricultural transition among  
62 Western countries. 
 
Note: The figure shows the added-variable plot for the unconditional relationship between Log GDP per capita in 2005 
and Time since agricultural transition (Putterman, 2006). N=62, R2=0.056, p-value < 0.053. OLS estimates using robust 
standard errors. Each country is identified by a three-letter isocode. Time since agricultural transition is taken from 
Putterman (2006). Western countries are all countries in Europe, North Africa, and Middle East, plus Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, India, and Iran.   
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Figure 3: Our model  
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Figure 4: Scatter plot showing time since first state formation and average time since agricultural transition 
for 52 Western countries with markers weighted by GDP per capita in 2005 
 
Note: N=52. Each circle represents a country and the size of each marker is determined by its level of GDP per 
capita in 2005, ranging from <1500 USD (smallest markers) to >29000 USD (largest markers). Average time since 
agricultural transition uses a measure constructed from Pinhasi et al (2005). Time since first state formation is taken 
from Borcan et al (2012). Western countries include all countries in Europe, North Africa, and Middle East, plus 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, India, and Iran.   
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Figure 5: Neolithic sites and the spread of agriculture in Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Neolithic sites and spread of agriculture in the Western core 
 
Figure 7: Biogeography in the Western core 10,000 years ago 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Average time since agricultural transition among Italian regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Average GDP per capita 1997-2008 among Italian regions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Conditional relationship between log GDP per capita in 2005 and average time since 
agricultural transition among 64 Western countries 
 
Note: The figure shows the added-variable plot for the conditional relationship between Log GDP per capita in 2005 
and Average time since agricultural transition from the regression specification in table 1, column 4.  
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Figure 11: Relationship between the annual growth rate of GDP per capita 1000-1500 CE and average 
time since agricultural transition among 21 Western countries 
 
Note: The figure shows the added-variable plot for the unconditional relationship between Percent growth of GDP per 
capita 1000-1500 CE and Average time since agricultural transition (in 1000 CE) from the regression specification in table 
6, column 3. 
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Figure 12: Relationship between log GDP per capita in 2005 and time since agricultural transition among  
41 Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
Note: The figure shows the unconditional bivariate relationship between Time since agricultural transition and Log GDP 
per capita in 2005. N=41, R2=0.281, p-value < 0.001. OLS estimate using robust standard errors. Each country is 
identified by a three-letter isocode. Time since agricultural transition is taken from Putterman (2006).  
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Figure 13: Relationship between log GDP per capita in 2005 and time since agricultural transition among  
22 Central and East Asian countries. 
 
Note: The figure shows the unconditional bivariate relationship between Time since agricultural transition and Log GDP 
per capita in 2005. N=22, R2=0.186, p-value = 0.074. OLS estimates using robust standard errors. Each country is 
identified by a three-letter isocode. Time since agricultural transition is taken from Putterman (2006).  
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Table 1: Relationship between time since agricultural transition and GDP per capita among 1,371 European 
NUTS-3 regions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Dependent variable:  
Log Average GDP per capita 1997-2008 
        
Average time since agricultural 
transition 
-0.484*** 
(0.0210) 
-0.473*** 
(0.032) 
-0.379*** 
(0.036) 
-0.147*** 
(0.033) 
-0.121*** 
(0.034) 
-0.198*** 
(0.027) 
-0.066 
(0.060) 
 
Log Region Area  -0.277*** -0.240*** -0.203*** -0.207*** -0.112*** -0.120*** 
  (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.032) 
Altitude  0.096 -0.177** -0.219*** -0.213*** -0.405*** -0.166 
  (0.073) (0.079) (0.064) (0.065) (0.057) (0.104) 
Latitude  -0.019*** -0.057*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.005 0.012 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.021) 
Steppe Tundra, 10000 Yrs Ago   0.004 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.001 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ice, 10000 Yrs Ago   0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.001 0.002 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Polar Desert, 10000 Yrs Ago   0.011*** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008*** 0.005* 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Semi Desert, 10000 Yrs Ago   -0.010*** -0.007** -0.008** -0.011*** -0.003 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Dry Steppe, 10000 Yrs Ago   -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.002 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Wooded Steppe, 10000 Yrs Ago   0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Temperate Forest, 10000 Yrs Ago   -0.009** -0.004 -0.005 -0.009*** -0.001 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ottoman Empire (dummy)    -0.870*** -0.873*** -0.313*** -0.180** 
    (0.070) (0.071) (0.080) (0.078) 
Roman Empire (dummy)    0.335*** 0.321*** 0.153*** 0.223*** 
    (0.034) (0.035) (0.027) (0.051) 
Byzantine Empire (dummy)    -0.207*** -0.214*** -0.421*** 0.091 
    (0.074) (0.076) (0.082) (0.192) 
Atlantic Ocean (dummy)     0.152*** -0.134*** -0.005 
     (0.048) (0.034) (0.053) 
Warsaw Pact or Soviet Republic 
(dummy) 
     -1.251*** 
(0.038) 
 
Country Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes 
Constant 12.99*** 15.836*** 16.553*** 13.350*** 13.262*** 12.368*** 10.151*** 
 (0.147) (0.496) (0.799) (0.779) (0.791) (0.533) (1.130) 
        
Observations 1,371 1,371 1,370 1,370 1,370 1,370 1,370 
Countries 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.234 0.408 0.486 0.611 0.613 0.812 0.903 
 
Note: The estimator is OLS in all specifications. The sample is all Western regions with available data. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Relationship between time since agricultural transition and GDP per capita among 107 Italian 
NUTS3-regions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dependent variable: 
Log Average GDP per capita 1997-2008 
      
Average time since agricultural         
transition 
-0.565*** 
(0.106) 
-0.251*** 
(0.062) 
-0.187*** 
(0.052) 
-0.173*** 
(0.055) 
-0.173*** 
(0.055) 
 
Log Region Area   0.065*** 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 
  (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Altitude  -0.132*** -0.058 -0.061 -0.061 
  (0.037) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) 
Latitude  0.088*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 
  (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Polar Desert, 10000 yrs ago    0.084 0.096 0.096 
   (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) 
Dry steppe, 10000 yrs ago    0.178*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 
   (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Byzantine Empire (dummy)    -0.045 -0.045 
    (0.048) (0.048) 
Constant 14.09*** 7.573*** 7.929*** 7.927*** 7.927*** 
 (0.785) (0.572) (0.606) (0.597) (0.597) 
      
Observations 107 107 107 107 107 
R-squared 0.208 0.802 0.826 0.827 0.827 
 
Note: The estimator is OLS in all specifications. The sample is all Italian regions with available data. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Relationship between time since agricultural transition and GDP per capita in 2005 among Western, European, and former Roman countries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent variable: 
Log GDP per capita in 2005 
Sample Western Europe Roman empire 
         
Average time since 
agricultural transition 
-0.492*** 
(0.133) 
-0.573*** 
(0.131) 
-0.434*** 
(0.151) 
-0.642*** -0.459** -0.441** -0.560** -0.645*** 
(0.124) (0.203) (0.210) (0.212) (0.186) 
         
Log Country area  -0.207*** -0.056 -0.098  -0.025  -0.117* 
  (0.050) (0.064) (0.061)  (0.056)  (0.067) 
Log Arable land  -0.415*** -0.507*** -0.366***  -0.208  0.061 
  (0.105) (0.124) (0.110)  (0.193)  (0.238) 
Log Altitude  -0.196* -0.456*** -0.400***  -0.028  0.027 
  (0.117) (0.125) (0.129)  (0.135)  (0.232) 
Atlantic coastline to 
area-ratio 
  17.217 
(10.903) 
 
-2.075  
(7.775) 
 -6.053  
(7.181) 
 -5.787  
(9.964) 
Roman empire (fraction of 
area) 
  1.598*** 
(0.364) 
1.219*** 
(0.336) 
 0.334  
(0.460) 
  
Byzantine empire (fraction 
of area) 
  0.541 
(0.460) 
0.201  
(0.397) 
 -0.418  
(0.313) 
 0.000  
(0.295) 
Ottoman empire (fraction 
of area) 
  -1.302*** 
(0.483) 
-0.384  
(0.477) 
    
Warsaw pact or Soviet 
republic (dummy)  
   -1.129***  -1.770***  -1.794*** 
   (0.267)  (0.241)  (0.274) 
Constant 12.435*** 14.836*** 12.503*** 14.379*** 12.313*** 13.595*** 13.184*** 14.775*** 
 (0.984) (1.171) (1.394) (1.083) (1.389) (1.194) (1.615) (1.591) 
         
Observations 64 64 64 64 40 40 31 31 
R-squared 0.16 0.44 0.62 0.70 0.10 0.81 0.19 0.72 
 
Note: The estimator is OLS in all specifications. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample of Western countries includes all 
countries specified as Western in the text. The sample of countries from the Roman empire includes all countries in which more than 50 percent of its territory was 
within the Roman empire in 200 AD.  
 
 
 
Table 4: Robustness analysis  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Dependent variable: 
Log GDP per capita in 2005 
Sample Western Site obs>0 Western 
          
Time since agricultural transition 
(Putterman, 2006) 
-0.175* 
(0.089) 
-0.123 
(0.093) 
       
Earliest date of transition (Pinhasi 
et al, 2005) 
  -0.285*** 
(0.088) 
-0.247** 
(0.104) 
     
Average time since agricultural 
transition 
    -0.510*** 
(0.134) 
-0.534*** 
(0.147) 
-0.469** 
(0.198) 
-0.516* 
(0.277) 
-0.469* 
(0.233) 
Log Arable land   -0.259**  -0.302***  -0.284** -0.632*** -0.329 -0.285 
  (0.105)  (0.104)  (0.114) (0.223) (0.371) (0.299) 
Log Latitude       1.733** -0.312 2.091* 
       (0.777) (1.227) (1.033) 
Log Land Suitability for  
Agriculture  
      0.078 
(0.188) 
-0.048 
(0.274) 
-0.298 
(0.281) 
Steppe (fraction 10000 yrs ago)        2.205* 
(1.213) 
1.328 
(0.961) 
Polar desert (fraction 10000 yrs 
ago) 
       3.959*** 
(0.878) 
0.704 
(1.069) 
Ice (fraction 10000 yrs ago)        3.430*** -0.048 
        (1.228) (1.119) 
Wooded steppe (fraction 10000 yrs 
ago) 
       2.405* 
(1.236) 
0.975 
(1.021) 
Log Country Area & Log Altitude 
controls 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No No No 
Insignificant biogeographical 
controls  
No No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Historical controls No No No No No No No No Yes 
Constant 9.868*** 10.622*** 11.090*** 12.013*** 12.872*** 14.300*** 7.429* 12.731** 4.069 
 (0.640) (1.199) (0.769) (1.068) (0.988) (1.325) (4.252) (6.173) (5.270) 
          
Observations 62 62 60 60 44 44 55 52 52 
R-squared 0.06 0.28 0.11 0.33 0.23 0.47 0.41 0.57 0.80 
          
Note: The estimator is OLS in all specifications. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample of Western countries includes all 
countries specified as Western in the text. The sample Site obs>0 includes all countries that have at least one site observation in Pinhasi et al’s (2005) data set. Insignificant 
biographical controls includes the following variables measuring the fraction of a country’s area that was covered by different types of biogeography in 10,000 BCE: Desert, 
Tropical extreme, Semi-desert, Dry steppe, and Mediterranean. Historical controls include Atlantic coastline to area-ratio and the fractions of countries in Roman empire, Byzantine empire, 
and Ottoman empire, as well as a dummy for Warsaw pact or Soviet republic.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Historical evolution of relationships between average time since agricultural transition and population density, GDP per capita, and levels of 
technology among Western countries.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
Log Population density in: 
Dependent variable:  
Log GDP per capita in: 
 
Technology level in: 
Average time since 
agricultural transition in: 
1 CE 1000 CE 1500 CE 1 CE 1000 CE 1500 CE 1 CE 1500 CE 
         
- 1 CE 0.215   0.088***   0.027**  
 (0.142)   (0.014)   (0.013)  
- 1000 CE  -0.001   0.106***    
  (0.125)   (0.020)    
- 1500 CE   -0.231*   -0.056***  -0.043*** 
   (0.137)   (0.024)  (0.013) 
Constant -0.164 1.328 3.375*** 5.689*** 5.441*** 6.813*** 0.769*** 1.113*** 
 (0.814) (0.850) (1.015) (0.074) (0.109) (0.169) (0.083) (0.088) 
         
Observations 54 60 61 24 21 22 49 38 
R-squared 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.37 0.71 0.09 0.05 0.15 
 
Note: The estimator is OLS in all specifications. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample is always all Western countries 
with available data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Average time since agricultural transition and percentage growth rates of population and GDP per 
capita, 1000-1500 CE, among Western countries. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dependent variable: 
 Percent population growth, 
1000-1500 CE 
Percent growth of GDP per capita,  
1000-1500 CE 
      
Average time since 
agricultural transition in 
1000 CE 
-0.0571*** 
(0.011) 
-0. 0571*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0347*** 
(0.004) 
-0.0309*** 
(0.009) 
-0.0313** 
(0.011) 
Log Population density in 
1000 CE 
 -0.0003 
(0.009) 
   
Log GDP per capita in 
1000 CE 
   -0.0360 
(0.074) 
 
Log Latitude     0.0220 
     (0.078) 
Constant 0. 4719*** 0. 4723*** 0.2864*** 0. 4826 0.1819 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.031) (0.404) (0.359) 
      
Observations 60 60 21 21 21 
R-squared 0.36 0.36 0.52 0.53 0.52 
 
Note: The estimator is OLS in all specifications. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The sample is always all Western countries with available data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Influence of time since agricultural transition on institutions among Western countries. 
 
  OLS point estimate for  
Average time since agricultural 
transition in: 
  .  
 Dependent variables: 1500 CE 2000 CE Constant Controls Obs. R2 
        
(1) Executive constraints in 1500 CE -0.262** 
(0.116) 
 
 3.380*** 
(0.766) 
No 24 0.09 
(2) 
State antiquity index, 1500-1950 
CE 
-0.044* 
(0.023) 
 0.983*** 
(0.164) 
No 51 0.07 
(3) -0.061** 
(0.025) 
 0.780*** 
(0.257) 
Yes 51 0.62 
(4) 
Corruption in 2010 CE 
 -0.536*** 
(0.101) 
4.410*** 
(0.779) 
No 62 0.32 
(5)  -0.599*** 
(0.117) 
5.421*** 
(1.032) 
Yes 62 0.69 
(6) 
Democracy in 2010 CE 
 -3.359*** 
(0.696) 
29.996*** 
(4.966) 
No 57 0.30 
(7)  -3.843*** 
(0.749) 
30.874*** 
(6.465) 
Yes 57 0.67 
(8) 
Gini coefficient in 2000 CE 
 2.414*** 
(0.609) 
14.947*** 
(4.496) 
No 42 0.26 
(9)  3.210*** 
(0.729) 
7.111 
(6.568) 
Yes 42 0.40 
 
Note: The estimator is OLS in all specifications. The dependent variables in each regression are shown in the first 
column to the left. The control variables are Log Country area, Log Arable land, Log altitude, Atlantic coastline to area-ratio, 
Roman empire, Byzantine empire, Ottoman empire, and Warsaw pact or Soviet Republic. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample is always all Western countries with available data. 
Appendices (online only)
Appendix 1: Comparative country analysis
In order to illustrate the logic of our model further, we will in this section make a
more detailed comparative country analysis, using Iraq and Sweden as examples. Iraq
and Sweden are two extreme observations in Figure 4. Iraq was one of the very earliest
countries to experience sedentary agriculture and statehood and is currently one of the
poorest and institutionally least developed countries in the western world. For Sweden,
the situation is right the opposite. Our analysis aims to demonstrate that Iraqs long
history has been characterized by extractive institutions in the form of autocratic, unstable
state formations, a weak rule of law, a persistent social and economic inequality, and
intense rent seeking, whereas Swedens late transition to agriculture and much shorter
history is characterized by more stable and broadly inclusive governments, an egalitarian
and democratic society, and an absence of major internal or external struggles over the
distribution of resources.
Iraq
The northern parts of current Iraq, as well as the eastern parts on both sides of the
Iranian border, were part of the Fertile Crescent where the very earliest signs of domesti-
cated plants and animals in the world have been found. In Neolithic times, the area was
characterized by open wood and grasslands and hosted a large number of heavy-seeded
wild grasses including the wild progenitors of wheat and barley. After a temporary down-
turn in temperature levels (referred to as the Younger Dryas), evidence of domesticated
plants started to appear after 9500 BCE in Syrian sites such as Abu Hureyra and soon
spread to the whole region (Diamond, 1997; Bellwood, 2005). Animals such as goats and
pigs were domesticated somewhat later, presumably on the anks of the Zagros Mountains
(Smith, 1995; Diamond, 1997). A few thousand years later, they would be complemented
with cattle and horses.
One of the oldest archaeological sites in northern Iraq is Qermez Dere, with an agri-
cultural settlement from about 9000 BCE (Pinhasi et al, 2005). One of the most notable
ndings on this site was three circular, underground chambers lled with tons of soil,
supported by heavy plastered stone pillars and containing six buried jawless skulls. Even
more impressive monuments have been found in other parts of the Fertile Crescent, such
as a cluster of spacious underground chambers with pillars, each weighing 8 tons or more
in Göbekli Tepe, and the massive walls and nearly 8 meter high defensive tower of Jericho,
both from about 9000 BCE (Morris, 2010). Clearly, monuments like these were the result
of closely coordinated work e¤orts by a village community.
Similar ndings from neighboring sites from the same period provide a picture of a
sedentary population, living in tight village settlements with houses in uniform style, sep-
arate community buildings, shrines and sometimes defensive fortications, and a worship-
ping of ancestors manifested in the keeping of plastered skulls, presumably of ancestors.
Several instances of headless burials could potentially be interpreted as human sacrice.
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Some of the largest settlements, such as Abu Hureyra in Syria, hosted around 5000 peo-
ple already by 8000 BCE (Bellwood, 2005). Houses with own storerooms and kitchens
would soon emerge. Together with the almost obsessive reverence of ancestors, these so-
cial changes indicate a society with important public goods but also one where private
property started to matter and where land was inherited from one generation to the next
(Morris, 2010). As we know from the work of Mulder et al (2009), such a pattern of inher-
itance in agricultural communities typically leads to the emergence of income inequality
and a hierarchical society.
The heartland of historical Mesopotamia, i.e. the land between Euphrates and Tigris,
was not settled by farmers until about 5000 BCE. Despite the rivers, the area was generally
drier than in the grasslands of the nearby Fertile Crescent, further to the east. Productive
farming could still be carried out with the use of irrigation technology that diverted water
from the ooding rivers. This technique required substantial collective activities such as
the construction of canal regulators, digging out and dredging canals and reservoirs, and
digging earthen dykes that protected elds from ooding water. In order to be e¢ cient,
the structure of the irrigation system had to be planned and work carefully coordinated.
A failure at any link in this highly sensitive system might have disastrous consequences
for the village.1 Workers further had to be fed and provided with e¤ective tools and the
structure of elds and cultivation had to be carefully planned (Postgate, 1995).
All these characteristics of the new production technology implied pressures towards
creating a strong centralized power. In the rural villages, irrigation management was
coordinated by an o¢ cial referred to as gugallum (Postgate, 1995, p 178). It is certainly
straightforward to think of this kind of social organization as being the driver of the further
development towards more centralized power in the villages which eventually resulted in
full-blown city-states. The famous hydraulic hypothesis of Wittfogel (1957) proposes that
the nature of water management in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and China was responsible
for the rise of highly centralized states in these regions.2 Exactly how causality worked
between collective water management and centralized rule in Mesopotamia remains to be
established, but the association is in any case clear.
A climate downturn around 3800 BCE with even less rain and less reliable ooding
of the rivers, put a great strain on the already fragile ecological system of Mesopotamia.
It has been suggested that this downturn provided a further impetus towards a more
e¢ cient organization and use of resources (Morris, 2010). Only the cities that succeeded
in this endeavour survived and most likely experienced an inow of people from collapsed
communities.3 One of the oldest cities in the area was Eridu where the earliest settlement
dates back to 5400 BCE. Archaeological excavations have revealed that the city hosted a
1The failure of any individual to regulate the ow of water might for instance lead to the ooding of
the elds of a whole village.
2The hypothesis has been criticized on many grounds, for instance that the major Chinese e¤orts at
centralized water management were made after the rise of centralized rule.
3Yo¤ee (1995) even refers to this sudden urbanization process as a "demographic implosion" which
resulted in a relative depopulation of the countryside.
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succession of temple structures, built on top of each other, with the earliest small shrine
dating to 5000 BCE (Postgate, 1995).
During this period, Uruk emerged as a leader among the growing cities in the area and
soon became very inuential culturally, not only in Mesopotamia but also in neighboring
lands. Around 3500 BCE, the rst statehood arose. This event is generally viewed as
the onset of what is usually referred to as civilization. The Sumerians in Uruk invented
cuneiform writing around 3300 BCE, inscribed on clay tables, and used bronze on a large
scale by 3000 BCE. The massive temple area was clearly the home of a very powerful
"priest-king", managing a temple economy that controlled substantial areas of agricultural
land as well as farm labor to work its elds. The clay tablets that have been recovered often
record temple production quotas. A highly specialized labor force worked in the temples
apart from the priests, including accountants, guards, water-carriers, weavers, boatmen,
barbers, and musicians, as well as regular slaves (Postgate, 1995). The temple most likely
also organized the long-distance trade that brought foreign luxury goods to Mesopotamia
and contributed to the more e¢ cient mining of metals like bronze and copper. Humble
citizens presented regular o¤erings to the gods (and food rations to the temple sta¤) and
were often sent to war on neighboring city-states in large military campaigns. The city of
Uruk is believed to have covered around 400 hectares with a 9 km town wall (Postgate,
1995) and presumably hosted around 20,000 individuals, packed into carefully planned
mud brick dwellings (Morris, 2010).
Uruks eminence in Mesopotamia ended early in the 3rd millennium BCE for un-
clear reasons but their power had anyway always been more cultural than political. The
southern part of Mesopotamia remained for several centuries a land united by a common
Sumerian culture but where rivalling city-states often fought each other and remained
largely independent. In this sense, Mesopotamia after Uruk was more similar to the
highly fractionalized pre-Hellenic Greek system of city states than to neighboring Egypt,
which was led by a single ruler. Sargon of Akkad was the rst Mesopotamian ruler to
unite the whole area under one reign around 2350 BCE, but the Akkadian domination
turned out to be short-lived. By 2200, both the Egyptian and the Mesopotamian states
collapsed and foreign rulers (Gutians) assumed power in the Sumerian heartland.
This was perhaps the rst of many state collapses in which invading peoples from
neighboring areas played an important role. By 2030, the domination of the highly bu-
reaucratic regime in Ur was ended by invading Amorites from Iran. The Old Babylonian
empire that emerged after Ur was in turn conquered by yet another eastern people, the
Kassites, in 1595. An even greater disaster for the Western core would happen around
1200 BCE when more or less all the established states of the period collapsed, including
Egypt, the Mitanni and Hittite empires, and the Mycaenean Greek state. In Mesopotamia,
Assyria initially could expand but soon fell into the general decline. The city of Babylon
was sacked by Elamites from Iran.
Exactly what happened during this Dark Age has much debated and explanations range
from natural disasters to massive migrations. The outcome was basically the same every-
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where; burned and destroyed cities, depopulation, a protracted break in written records,
collapse of long-distance trade, and an abandonment of agricultural land (Morris, 2010).
Not until the brief rise of the neo-Assyrian empire around 750 BCE would the current ter-
ritory of Iraq be under a single ruler again, and by this time the political and technological
leadership of the western world had shifted westwards towards the Mediterranean.
In 539 BCE, the Persians under Cyrus II plundered Babylon and initiated a period
of more than a thousand years when Mesopotamia was completely under the domination
of foreign powers; most often under Persian rule but also briey under the Seleucid, Ro-
man and Sassanid empires (see gure 6). Almost all of the major autocratic empires of
the Mediterranean seemed to want to conquer Mesopotamia during some part of their
expansion. The time of independent city-states was long gone.4
The long era of Arab Muslim rule started in 638 CE when the Sassanids were defeated.
A mass immigration of Arabs took place in this period. The following centuries witnessed
a revival of social development and the newly founded capital of the Abbasid caliphate,
Baghdad, became a center of the Muslim intellectual world. The caliphate reached a peak
the period 750-800 CE in terms of the extension of statehood and it is believed that the
city hosted nearly a million people.
However, once again, a foreign aggressor would invade Mesopotamia, as had happened
so many times before. The Mongols lay Baghdad under siege in 1258 and eventually
conquered and looted the city and murdered a large share of its population. Some sources
claim that at least 100,000 people, perhaps much more than so, were slaughtered and
palaces and libraries were destroyed. The Mongol destruction initiated a new period of
depopulation and agricultural decline, perhaps due to irreparable damages to the sensitive
irrigation system in the area. The sacking of Baghdad was a major blow not only to Arab
civilization in Iraq but also to the Muslim world as a whole.
From 1533, the territory of modern Iraq would fall under the domination of yet another
foreign power, the Ottomans, who would rule the area more or less e¤ectively until 1918.
During this period, Iraq was divided into three provinces (vilayets) - Mosul, Baghdad,
and Basra - a division which would play an important role since then. At its peak,
the Ottoman empire was the largest in the western world since Rome. The Ottomans
put the Iraqi provinces under direct rule shortly after their conquest, but during the
protracted disintegration of the Ottoman empire after its peak around 1600, local rulers
would frequently struggle for power against each other and against foreign powers. The
British gradually asserted their inuence during the 19th century in the area. When the
Ottoman empire collapsed after the World War I, Britain administered Iraq on a mandate
from the League of Nations until Iraqi independence in 1932.
Independence did not create political stability in Iraq. Frequent power struggles and a
new intervention by Great Britain during World War II followed, and military coups took
place both in 1958 and in 1968. The latter brought the Baath-party of Saddam Hussein
to power. Iraq established closer ties to the Soviet union and oil started to generate
4The rest of the section relies on Britannica (2012) for general dates and facts.
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substantial revenues to the government. After 1980, three successive wars in the Gulf
area (the Iran-Iraq war, 1980-1988, and the Persian Gulf Wars in 1991 and 2003) would
however lead to an economic deterioration of the country and to the dissolution of Saddam
Husseins regime. From 2003 to 2011, the country was occupied by yet another foreign
power on Mesopotamian soil; the United States.
In summary, we believe the Iraqi example has the following key components in relation
to our model: It describes an area that was one of the rst in the world to develop
sedentary agriculture by 9000 BCE and statehood and civilization already by 3500 BCE.
Although Mesopotamia started o¤ with fairly independent city-states, government was
highly autocratic, inequality was high and wealth was highly concentrated in temples and
palaces. The rich Mesopotamian cities soon became the object of predation by numerous
neighboring tribes and foreign armies with subsequent state collapses. By medieval times,
the polities in the Iraqi territories were clearly stagnant. Throughout the 20th century,
internal and external rent seeking have been the norm. Although a kind of parliamentary
democracy is now in place, Iraq as of 2012 is by many regarded as one of the failed states
of the world.
Sweden
At about the same time that a full-blown civilization with a socially stratied state,
codied writing, massive public monuments, and a centralized "palace economy", admin-
istered by bureaucrats, was emerging in Mesopotamia (i.e. middle 4th millennium BCE),
the rst small farming communities established themselves along the coasts of what is
now Sweden, employing the agricultural food package from the Fertile Crescent; wheat,
barley, pigs, goats, and cattle. Recent evidence strongly indicate that it was migrants from
southern parts that introduced agriculture and that these migrants later blended with the
local hunter-gatherer population (Skoglund et al, 2012). There are clear links from this
early farming culture with other communities in northern Europe at the time.5
Unlike the riverine type of farming practiced in Mesopotamia, agriculture in Sweden
was always rain fed, implying a weaker need for a centralized organization of the economy.
As elsewhere in the Atlantic parts of Northern Europe, the construction of megalithic
tombs were a common feature of early farming communities, suggesting an increased
reverence for the dead and an emerging organization for the provision of public goods.
Copper was used by these early farmers but the metal was not widespread and presumably
imported. Bronze was not widely used until about 1500 BCE, a change which most likely
revolutionized warfare and social organization. During the latter part of the period, very
large burial mounds suggest an increase in social stratication although not beyond tribal
level (Welinder, 2009).
The use of iron became widespread in Sweden around 500 BCE. The Scandinavian
countries did not become part of the Roman empire but were nonetheless a¤ected by
5The culture is referred to as TRB and shares many features with the so called "Ertebölle" culture of
Denmark from the same period (Bellwood, 2005).
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developments on the continent. In particular, the collapse of the Western Roman empire
in the 5th century CE and the massive migrations during the period, resulted in a period of
social unrest in Sweden, manifested in the construction of multiple defensive fortications.
By 550 CE, a more peaceful period referred to as "Vendel" started in Sweden when
tribal chiefs in various parts of the country could establish rule over extended regions and
were buried in impressive burial mounds. The greater concentration of wealth was due to a
centralized control over iron mining and the establishment of trading centers which greatly
increased imports and exports. The chiefs controlled forces of mounted elite warriors with
costly weaponry, o¤ered pagan ceremonies in wooden halls, and oversaw the production
of jewelry in gold (Welinder, 2009). Primitive writing in the form of runes were carved
into stone.
In the latter part of the 700s, the trading post Birka was founded in Lake Mälaren by
a local unidentied chief and quickly emerged into the rst urban settlement of Sweden.
However, even at its peak, the size of the population still did not exceed 1000 individu-
als. Traded goods from many parts of the world have been excavated, including Arabic
countries. Christian missionaries appeared in the town in the 830s but failed to establish
Christendom in the area.
By 800 CE, Sweden was still very much a periphery in the Western world; culturally,
economically and politically. However, population growth had been rapid since the great
migrations ended and local chiefs had accumulated the power to equip troops with expen-
sive weaponry and horses and to build long ships that were capable of making long sea
voyages. In 793, a eet of such ships reached the monastery of Lindisfarne in Northern
England, which was subsequently looted and the local population terrorized. This at-
tack is usually regarded as marking the beginning of the Viking Age in the Scandinavian
countries.
The Viking attacks on the more developed parts of Europe that started around 800
basically followed the same pattern as so many other attacks by primitive peoples on more
advanced core regions. The wealthy cities of Mesopotamia were overrun by neighboring
tribes who had adopted the basic military technology of the center but were still not inte-
grated into its urban civilization. In the same manner, the Vikings looted numerous towns
and monasteries in Atlantic Europe, around the Baltic Sea, as well as in the Mediterranean.
Vikings formed new kingdoms in England and Normandy, settled Iceland and Greenland,
served as mercenaries to the emperor in Constantinople, and even formed a temporary
colony on New Foundland. Eventually, the Vikings outside Scandinavia blended with the
local populations, settled down and were Christianized.
When Viking energy subsided in the 11th century, there were kingdoms and states
in Norway and Denmark but still not in Sweden. The two core areas, Svealand around
Lake Mälaren and Götaland in the southwest, were not easily united and were divided by
deep forests. The country was eventually Christianized by 1100 and not until around 1150
was the country united under a king. From this period onwards, Sweden is considered to
have had a government above tribal level but with a very weak state and a king who had
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to struggle to maintain jurisdiction over local chiefs and independent bishops. Not until
the era of Birger Jarl, a strongman from Götaland whose son inherited the throne, was
the Swedish state consolidated around 1250, almost ve thousand years after the initial
emergence of agriculture.
As can be seen in gure 6, the date 1250 also marks the time when Sweden overtook
Iraq in terms of strength of statehood. In 1258, Iraq was overrun by yet another foreign
people, the Mongols, an event which ended the golden era of Arab culture in the region.
In peripheral Sweden, in contrast, no foreign peoples ever sought to invade the sparsely
populated and culturally backward country, lacking proper cities and fertile farming lands.
Traders from the German towns by the Baltic Sea dominated economic life in Sweden
throughout the Middle Ages but were never interested in the land as such. As elsewhere
in Europe, feudalism was the main economic organization of the countryside, but peasants
were generally a lot more independent than in for instance Eastern Europe. In 1393,
Sweden entered a union with its more powerful neighbor Denmark which would remain
until 1523, when the founder of the modern Swedish state, Gustav Wasa, defeated the
Danes, renegotiated debts with the German trading towns, suppressed local rebellions,
and nally established Sweden as a fully sovereign state.
In the early 17th century, Sweden adopted Protestantism and rose in the Thirty Years
War (1618-1648) to become a major military power in northern Europe, mainly due to its
superior organization of taxation and military service. Once again, Swedish armies pillaged
continental Europe and contributed to the long decline of the Holy German Empire. Also
Poland was badly ravaged during the rule of the constantly campaigning Charles X. New
territories were conquered from Denmark in the south and substantial amounts of war
booty enriched a nobility from which most of the military commanders had been recruited.
Inspired by the autocratic rule of Louis XIV in France, the Swedish kings Charles XI
and Charles XII ruled without taking much advice from parliament. After the decisive
Swedish defeat against Russia in 1709, Swedens period as a north European superpower
was e¤ectively over.
When Charles XII died in 1718, a new era started when the king had to secede substan-
tial powers to the parliament. Not even the attempts by Gustav III to restore autocratic
rule were successful and the king was even murdered in 1792. Sweden was clearly not
characterized by social equality in the modern sense during this period, but the farm-
ing population was relatively free and protected by law. After its involvement in the
Napoleonic wars in the early 1800s, Sweden adopted a principle of neutrality and has not
been engaged in any war since.
Free from military threats domestically and campaigns abroad, the country entered a
road towards an even stronger parliament and a widened su¤rage. A massive emigration
of poor Swedish peasants to the United States in the decades after 1850, eased a growing
problem of overpopulation in the countryside. During the strong social tensions after
World War I, which swept away the old regimes in so many European countries, universal
su¤rage of all men and women was introduced in 1921 and the Social Democratic Party
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was allowed to dominate Swedish politics from 1932 onwards. Since the country was spared
war damages in World War II due to its neutrality, the speed of industrialization picked
up even further when the demand for Swedish goods surged. Extensive social reforms and
progressive taxation turned Sweden into one of the most equal societies in Europe. Not
even the very serious economic crisis of the early 1990s altered the general trend of rising
prosperity.
By 2012, Sweden is one of the richest and least corrupt countries in the world and
has the strongest public nances in the European Union.6 Like in the neighboring Scan-
dinavian countries, there are no signs of social unrest, even in the wake of the nancial
crisis.
In summary, Swedens late transition to agriculture and to statehood, in combination
with its geographical peripherality and relatively unproductive farming lands, implied that
the country was not a natural target of predation by neighboring peoples or by rent seeking
local lords. Wealth was relatively evenly distributed through most of history and not
even the attempts by the militarily powerful kings of the 1600s succeeded in permanently
establishing autocratic rule. Due to the great degree of social cohesion, the social reforms
after World War II could be peacefully installed without alienating capitalists and the
upper classes. In so many ways, Swedens history was the direct opposite of that of Iraq.
Additional references:
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Appendix 2: Inverse Distance Weighted Interpolation
The rst step of calculating the average adoption date for a given region is interpolating
observed points of archaeological sites. For each cell S0 on the map, the formula used in
interpolation is as follows (Johnston-2003):
Y^ (S0) =
NX
i=1
iY (Si)
where:
Y^ (S0) is the predicted adoption date for location S0.
N is the number of measured sample points surrounding the prediction location that
will be used in the prediction. Here N is set to 15.
i are the weights assigned to each measured point.
Y (Si) is the observed value at the location Si, one of the known archaeological sites.
The formula to determine the weights is the following:
i = d
 p
i0 =
NX
i=1
d pi0
NX
i=1
i = 1
The power parameter p, which is determined by minimizing the root-mean-square
prediction error (RMSPE), is 2.7
In determining the adoption date of a given area, the paper assumes that the ar-
chaeological site closest to the area gives best information on the approximate date of
agricultural adoption, given the cost of travelling from one place to another and the simi-
larity of landscape of adjacent areas. That is, IDW considers proximity to each area to be
the most important factor in estimating adoption dates. IDW method is used to obtain
the average adoption date for each subnational unit of analysis, which is simply the aver-
age of all the estimated adoption date of location cells within that subnational unit. IDW
assumes that the surface is driven by the local variation, which can be captured through
the neighborhood. This method is part of the deterministic techniques to create a sur-
face of adoption dates. Another class of interpolation techniques, often known as kriging,
uses geostatistical properties. Kriging relies on autocorrelation as a function of distance
and assumes that the data comes from a stationary stochastic process. Given the terrain
variation and boundaries, however, the spread of agricultural adoption does not appear
to satisfy this assumption. Pinhasi (2005) nds that for Eurasia the agricultural adop-
tion date in an area can be well approximated as a linear function of the distance from
7Each observed point is removed and compared to the predicted value for that location. The RMSPE
is the summary statistic of the error of the prediction surface. The Geostatistical Analyst in ArcGIS tries
several di¤erent powers for IDW to identify the power that produces the minimum RMSPE.
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the origin in the Fertile Crescent. The correlation between IDW and kriging estimates
nevertheless remain very high (0.9729) and have little impact on the nal result.
10
Appendix 3: Vegetation Maps
The vegetation maps are the result of a compilation of information of many experts
of the Quaternary Environments Network (QEN). Adams-Faure (1997) address explicitly
the endogeneity issue arising from a map of palaeovegetation backed up by previous as-
sumptions about human subsistence, and assert that the maps are predominantly based
on non-archaeological sources. These include foremost the use of plant fossil data (non-
domesticated at the advent of the Neolithic Revolution), the most direct source of infor-
mation on past vegetation. Given that there are still large enough gaps in the pollen and
macrofossil record across regions, however, other sources are used as well to supplement the
picture from plant fossils. Proxy indicators of past vegetation cover and structure include
animal fossils, which give a rough indicator of the ecology of an area in the past. Adams-
Faure (1997) also argue that sedimentological processes depend on vegetation cover, either
in the area where the sediment is being deposited or the area from which it is being eroded;
certain types of sediments therefore may be used to support plan fossil data in more ac-
curately describing the type of vegetation. Furthermore, the authors use the standard
palaeoenvironmental assumption of the past existence of a monsoon belt, embedded in
the drawing of the map. To a lesser extent, the trends predicted by general circulation
models (GCMs), which examine the e¤ects of the presence of lower sea levels, cold seas
and massive ice sheets in the past, are used to describe spatial patterns and vegetation
boundaries as well. For further discussions on the use of general circulation models, see
Adams-Faure (1997). Finally, the authors use biogeographical clues based on the present
day distributions of ora and fauna, as a reference to what may have existed back during
the Neolithic period. However, this approach is only used as a way to back up or dispute
patterns suggested on the basis of palaeoenvironmental evidence, not as a primary source
of ideas and opinions.
The Soil Quality Ranking of Vegetation Types in Europe and the Middle East :
HIGHEST
Wooded Steppe
Mediterranean Scrubs
Temperate forest, Lake
Dry Steppe and Semi desert
Steppe-Tundra
Desert
Polar Desert, Ice
Tropical Extreme Desert
LOWEST
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Appendix 4-6 
 
Table A4: Summary statistics and sources of variables used in the cross-regional study 
 
Variables N Mean SD Min Max Source 
       
Dependent variable       
Log Average GDP per capita 1997-2008 (in €) 1,371 9.580 0.846 6.802 11.83 Eurostat (2012) 
       
Independent variables       
Average time since agricultural transition (in 1000 
yrs from 2000 CE) 
1,371 7.055 0.847 5.243 11.32 Own assessment based 
on Pinhasi et al (2005) 
Log Region area (km 2) 1,371 7.382 1.384 2.962 10.58 Own assessment 
Altitude (km) 1,371 0.348 0.363 -0.003 2.328 Own assessment 
Latitude 1,371 47.97 5.169 35.05 59.77 Own assessment 
Steppe Tundra, 10000 Yrs Ago (percent of area) 1,370 59.92 48.11 0 100 Own assessment 
Ice, 10000 Yrs Ago (percent of area) 1,370 2.049 13.28 0 100 Own assessment 
Polar Desert, 10000 Yrs Ago (percent of area) 1,370 2.779 14.61 0 100 Own assessment 
Semi Desert, 10000 Yrs Ago (percent of area) 1,370 0.559 6.648 0 100 Own assessment 
Dry Steppe, 10000 Yrs Ago (percent of area) 1,370 17.39 36.20 0 100 Own assessment 
Wooded Steppe, 10000 Yrs Ago (percent of area) 1,370 16.20 35.43 0 100 Own assessment 
Temperate Forest, 10000 Yrs Ago (percent of area) 1,370 0.437 5.683 0 100 Own assessment 
Ottoman Empire (dummy=1 if region part of 
empire in 1600 CE) 
1,371 0.155 0.362 0 1 Own assessment based 
on Euratlas (2012) 
Roman Empire (dummy=1 if region part of empire 
in 200 CE) 
1,371 0.670 0.471 0 1 Own assessment based 
on Euratlas (2012) 
Byzantine Empire (dummy=1 if region part of 
empire in 500 CE) 
1,371 0.129 0.335 0 1 Own assessment based 
on Euratlas (2012) 
Atlantic Ocean (dummy=1 if region located by 
Atlantic ocean) 
1,371 0.116 0.320 0 1 Own assessment 
Warsaw pact or Former Soviet republic (dummy=1 
if region part of the above before 1989) 
1,371 0.175 0.380 0 1 Own assessment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A5: Summary statistics and sources of variables for the regions in Italy 
 
Variables N Mean SD Min Max Source 
 
Dependent variables 
      
Log average GDP per capita 1997-2008 (in €) 107 9.928 0.275 9.330 10.459 Eurostat (2012) 
 
Independent variables 
      
Average time since agricultural transition (in 1000 
yrs from 2000 CE) 
107 7.363 0.222 6.734 8.092 Own assessment 
Log Region area 107 7.774 0.632 5.347 8.910 Own assessment 
Altitude 107 0.456 0.370 0.003 2.099 Own assessment 
Latitude 107 42.82 2.690 36.908 46.697 Own assessment 
Polar desert, 10000 yrs ago (fraction of area) 107 0.116 0.273 0.000 1.000 Own assessment 
Dry steppe, 10000 yrs ago (fraction of area) 107 0.434 0.462 0.000 1.000 Own assessment 
Wooded Steppe, 10000 yrs ago (fraction of area) 107 0.450 0.494 0.000 1.000 Own assessment 
Byzantine empire (dummy)  107 0.065 0.248 0.000 1.000 Own assessment 
based on Euratlas 
(2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A6: Summary statistics and sources of variables for the cross-country analysis 
 
Variables N Mean SD Min Max Source 
       
Dependent variables       
Log GDP per capita in 2005 (constant 2000 
USD) 
64 8.688 1.369 6.224 10.859 World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Log Population density in 1 CE 54 1.024 1.266 -1.481 3.170 Ashraf and Galor (2012) 
Log Population density in 1000 CE 60 1.318 1.136 -1.258 3.442 Ashraf and Galor (2012) 
Log Population density in 1500 CE 61 1.733 1.296 -1.258 4.135 Ashraf and Galor (2012) 
Log GDP per capita in 1 CE 24 6.158 0.169 5.991 6.696 Ashraf and Galor (2012) 
Log GDP per capita in 1000 CE 21 6.105 0.155 5.991 6.477 Ashraf and Galor (2012) 
Log GDP per capita in 1500 CE 22 6.440 0.229 6.064 7.003 Ashraf and Galor (2012) 
Technology level in 1 CE (average) 49 0.914 0.137 0.7 1 Comin et al (2010) 
Technology level in 1500 CE (average) 38 0.819 0.124 0.408 1 Comin et al (2010) 
Percent growth of population, 1000-1500 CE 60 0.092 0.106 -0.139 0.233 Own assessment based on 
Ashraf and Galor (2012) 
Percent growth of GDP per capita, 1000-1500 
CE 
21 0.069 0.059 -0.033 0.179 Own assessment based on 
Ashraf and Galor (2012) 
Executive contraints in 1500 CE 24 1.708 0.751 1 3 Acemoglu et al (2005b) 
State antiquity index, 1500-1950 CE  51 0.678 0.183 0.417 1 Putterman (2010) 
Corruption in 2010 62 0.335 1.062 -1.621 2.374 Worldwide Governance 
Indicators 2012 
Democracy in 2010 (Polity2) 57 4.404 7.178 -10 10 Polity data set 
Gini coefficient in 2000 42 32.402 4.906 24.44 44.1 WDI 
       
Independent variables       
Average time since agricultural transition (in 
1000 yrs from 2000 CE) 
64 7.611 1.100 5.608 9.743 Own assessment based on 
Pinhasi et al (2005) 
Log Country area (km 2) 64 4.501 2.131 -2.797 8.098  
Log Arable land (percent) 64 2.575 1.250 -2.106 4.028 WDI 
Log Altitude 64 -1.117 1.032 -4.198 0.588  
Atlantic coastline to area-ratio  64 0.0023 0.0079 0 0.051 Acemoglu et al (2005b) 
Roman Empire (fraction of country part of 
empire in 200 CE) 
64 0.469 0.455 0 1 Own assessment based on 
Euratlas (2012) 
Byzantine Empire (fraction of country part of 
empire in 500 CE) 
64 0.174 0.357 0 1 Own assessment based on 
Euratlas (2012) 
Ottoman Empire (fraction of country part of 
empire in 1600 CE) 
64 0.267 0.383 0 1 Own assessment based on 
Euratlas (2012) 
Warsaw pact or Former Soviet republic 
(dummy=1 if country part of the above 
before 1989) 
64 0.328 0.473. 0 1 Own assessment 
Time since agricultural transition (in 1000 yrs) 62 7.003 1.850 3.5 10.5 Putterman (2006) 
Earliest date of transition (in 1000 yrs) 60 8.446 1.593 5.673 12.408 Own assessment based on 
Pinhasi et al (2005) 
Log Latitude 64 3.700 0.271 2.734 4.097 Own assessment 
Log Land suitability for agriculture 55 -1.478 1.631 -5.799 -0.045 Ashraf and Galor (2012) 
Steppe Tundra, 10000 Yrs Ago (fraction of 
area) 
59 0.266 0.400 0 1 Own assessment 
Polar Desert, 10000 Yrs Ago (fraction of area) 59 0.032 0.110 0 0.497 Own assessment 
Ice, 10000 Yrs Ago (fraction of area) 59 0.035 0.131 0 0.663 Own assessment 
Wooded Steppe, 10000 Yrs Ago (fraction of 
area) 
59 0.151 0.297 0 1 Own assessment 
 
 
 
